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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis examines key characteristics of successful security sector reform. It 
builds on current theories regarding the critical elements of reform, analyzing how those 
principles could be applied to the Colombian case. Furthermore, this thesis uses the case 
studies of El Salvador and Sri Lanka to examine which aspects of their post-conflict 
security sector reform plans were successful and which could be modified to increase the 
chance of long-term stability in Colombia. While Colombia shifts its focus from civil 
conflict and internal criminal investigations to a more strategic outlook with long-term 
goals of addressing human rights violations, providing oversight of the security sector, 
and maintaining peace, the intelligence, military, and police sectors all need to undergo 
reform. As the FARC disarms and right-wing paramilitary organizations disband, the 
Colombian security sector can develop ways to re-integrate the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), into 
society, rebuild trust with the population that suffered various human rights violations 
throughout the civil conflict, and modify the security sector’s mission set to address new 
regional concerns. Using the comparative analysis from the case studies, this thesis 
develops a model for Colombia’s post-conflict security sector transformation. 
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Colombia has spent the past few years transitioning from a country dominated by 
civil conflict between leftist revolutionary groups like the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarios de Colombia, or FARC, violent right-wing paramilitary organizations, 
and the state to a united nation working to re-integrate former guerrillas into society and 
implement peace agreements. Colombia’s security sector—comprised of the military, 
police, and intelligence organizations—has been negatively affected by the decades of 
internal conflict, often due to a lack of external oversight as the nation focused on 
eradicating left-wing groups and resolving the country’s civil conflict, allowing their ends 
to justify the means. Since its establishment in 1953—the same year a military coup d’etat 
resulted in a four-year military dictatorship in the country—Colombia’s intelligence 
service’s mission, for example, has fluctuated from police missions and crime 
investigations, to monitoring political opponents of the President, to collection on left-wing 
organizations and drug cartels.1   Likewise, the armed forces previously focused their 
training and missions on jungle operations and counterinsurgency, and will now need to 
shift their focus to operations against criminal groups integrated into the general 
population, and will also need to develop training for urban conflicts.2  In the same vein, 
the police were often given high levels of autonomy to coordinate with the military and 
combat guerrilla groups, and now need reforms to shift their role from tactical military 
operations to ensuring peace and stability at local levels.3 The first reform to the Police 
Code in fifty years was just approved in 2017, and aims to “increase enforcement for low-
                                                 
1 Spyridon Plakoudas, “Intelligence, Counter-Insurgency, and Democratization in Colombia,” Journal 
of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence 7 no. 1 (Jun 2016), 159–162, ISSN 2241–4991. 
2 Dr. R. Evan Ellis, “Strategic Insights: The Post-Conflict and the Transformation of Colombia’s 
Armed Forces,”  Strategic Studies Institute, last modified Aug 17, 2016,  https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/
index.cfm/articles/Colombias-Armed-Forces/2016/08/17  
3 “Colombia SSR Background,” Geneva Centre for Security Governance International Security Sector 
Advisory Team (ISSAT), September 14, 2018, https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library2/Country-
Profiles/Colombia-SSR-Background-Note#Anchor7. 
2 
level offenses, aiming to support a peaceful co-existence for Colombian citizens.”4  
Colombia’s security sector is looking for ways to incorporate former FARC combatants 
into society and potentially into the military to keep former FARC members from joining 
dissident groups and continuing to battle the state.5  Finally, corruption within the security 
sector has resulted in a lack of civilian trust, which must be addressed through the reform 
process with increased oversight mechanisms.6  While democratic civilian control and 
oversight mechanisms of the security institutions were established throughout the civil 
conflict, they were typically ignored in favor of rapid response.7  Orders typically flowed 
only from the executive branch to the security sector, bypassing the legislative branch and 
any other oversight bodies, and members of the security sector were not held accountable 
for their actions aimed at eradicating left-wing guerrillas.89  For example, the police forces 
and military forces forged complicated agreements and alignments with right-wing 
paramilitary groups in attempts to weed out left-wing opposition, leading to rampant 
human rights violations as the conflict waged on.  
While Colombia shifts its focus from civil conflict and internal criminal 
investigations to a more strategic outlook with long-term goals of addressing human rights 
violations, providing oversight of the security sector, and maintaining peace, the 
intelligence, military, and police sectors all need to undergo reform. As the FARC disarms 
and the right-wing paramilitary organizations disband, the Colombian security sector can 
develop ways to re-integrate the FARC into society, rebuild trust with the population that 
suffered various human rights violations throughout the civil conflict, and address new 
                                                 
4 Geneva Centre for Security Governance International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), 
“Colombia SSR Background.” 
5 “Colombia – Defense,” Export.gov, Aug 17, 2018, https://www.export.gov/article?id=Colombia-
Defense  
6 Geneva Centre for Security Governance International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), 
“Colombia SSR Background.” 
7 Geneva Centre for Security Governance International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), 
“Colombia SSR Background.” 
8 Geneva Centre for Security Governance International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), 
“Colombia SSR Background.” 
9 Plakoudas, “Intelligence, Counter-Insurgency, and Democratization in Colombia,” 160–162. 
3 
regional concerns, such as the unrest in neighboring Venezuela and the resulting 
humanitarian situation that is resulting from the Maduro regime. 
Under these circumstances, this thesis seeks to answer the following research 
question: What is an effective model for Colombia’s post-conflict security sector 
transformation? Specifically, using existing theoretical framework and empirical research 
on how different countries have re-designed their security sectors (police, military, and 
intelligence) after civil conflict, this thesis aspires to develop a model for Colombia’s post-
conflict security sector’s roles and missions. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis is relevant to the United States government for a variety of reasons. To 
begin with, United States policy-makers have had a vested interest in Colombia’s stability 
for decades, ultimately pushing a multi-billion-dollar aid plan known as Plan Colombia in 
2000. Plan Colombia involved economic, financial, military, human rights protection, 
social participation, counternarcotic, development, and peace strategies for Colombia, with 
a large portion of the money from the United States dedicated to the military and 
counternarcotic strategy piece of the plan.10  Ultimately, Plan Colombia helped Colombia 
to invest over one billion dollars annually into the military component, demonstrating the 
United States’ sustained commitment to  peace, stability, and economic development in 
Colombia.11  As Colombia begins down the road of long-term post-conflict stabilization 
and security sector reform (SSR), the existence of transnational criminal groups, drug 
traffickers, and a lack of governance in certain rural areas all could work to unravel the 
progress made by Plan Colombia.12  United States policy-makers have an especially keen 
eye on Colombia as Venezuela’s political upheaval has driven a wave of migrants to flee 
Venezuela to Colombia. A reformed security sector able to guide Colombia’s own post-
                                                 
10 Jonathan Rosen, The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond (New York: State University of New 
York Press, 2014), 23–41. 
11 Daniel Mejia, Plan Colombia: An Analysis of Effectiveness and Costs (Brookings, 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Mejia-Colombia-final-2.pdf. 
12 June S. Beittel, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS Report No. R43813 (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43813.pdf.  
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conflict restructuring as well as address any vulnerabilities added by unrest on the continent 
is critical for long-term national and regional stability—which this thesis aspires to provide.  
This research is equally relevant to policy-makers from countries around the 
world—including Latin America. This thesis may provide insights on the lessons learned 
and best/worst practices from Colombia’s security sector reform. For countries like 
Venezuela that are in the midst of a conflict between the Western-backed Congressional 
leader and the authoritarian President Maduro, lessons may be learned and applied from 
Colombia’s transition. Similarly, as Peru reforms and democratizes after its own decades 
fighting the Shining Path insurgents under more authoritarian leaders, Peruvian leaders can 
learn from Colombia’s reform process and reintegration of ex-combatants. Bordering 
countries in South America can monitor the reform planning and implementation process 
to ensure Colombia maintains stability and is accountable for the short- and long-term goals 
set in the process, adding to regional stability. 
Finally, examining the case of Colombia can provide new insights to scholars as a 
new case study on post-conflict security sector reform. While Colombia does have some 
similarities with many of the cases commonly examined for security sector reform (i.e. 
Timor-Leste, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan), its prior infrastructure varies 
from that within many of the common cases. Moreover, the re-structuring it undergoes may 
take a different path and provide further examples for research. Overall, advocates of 
security sector reform see security and development to be significant concerns, 
necessitating collaboration in planning and execution across the military, police, and 
intelligence sectors and incorporating civilians across the population in order to maintain 
national security and stability.13  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW  
This literature review provides an examination of the scholarly works related to 
security sector reform, and outlines the factors deemed most necessary for successful and 
                                                 
13 Thomas Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of 
Democratization and Civil-Military Relations,” Democratization 15, no. 5 (Dec 2008): 913, 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510340802362505  
5 
sustained reform. The main themes academics focus on are ownership of the reform 
process, inclusion of women in the reform process, long-term planning, short-term security 
solutions, human rights training, and balancing external intervention. 
1. Pre-established Elements for Successful Security Sector Reforms 
There is a body of literature that argues a few basic elements need to be pre-
established in a country prior to beginning the security sector reform process, and further 
built upon throughout the reform. According to Westerman, for instance, these elements 
include low to no levels of violence, the availability of basic infrastructure, legal 
framework, stable domestic political and security institutions, low corruption, and an active 
and informed society.14  Schnabel also recognizes the importance of a secure environment 
prior to initiating the reform process: “without a secure environment and a security system 
that ensures security even after the departure of international peace operations, political, 
economic, and cultural rebuilding are impossible.”15   Schnabel and Ehrhardt see the 
absence of conflict as crucial in order to encourage sustainable and focused reforms. 
Academics further note that the society must accept the need for the military to have a 
substantial role in society, and should acknowledge the military needs a certain degree of 
power to combat any existing or new threats to society, even as the civil conflict has 
concluded and the reform process has begun.16  Velasquez also address strategic objectives 
for countries undergoing security sector reform after conflict, noting how the security 
sector must be able to provide protection to the population and must maintain a deterrent 
capability to ensure prior conflicts do not reignite and disrupt the reform process.17  
                                                 
14 Ian Westerman, “Too Much Western Bias? The Need for a More Culturally Adaptable Approach to 
Security Sector Reform,” Defense and Security Analysis 33, no. 3 (July 2017): 280, https://doi.org/10.1080/
14751798.2017.1351602  
15 Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhardt, “Post-Conflict Societies and the Military: Challenges 
and Problems of Security Sector Reform,” in Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peace-Building, ed. 
Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), 1. 
16 Westerman, “Too Much Western Bias? The Need for a More Culturally Adaptable Approach to 
Security Sector Reform,” 284. 
17 Alejo Vargas Velasquez, “The Profile of the Colombian Armed Forces: a Result of the Struggle 
Against Guerrillas, Drug-Trafficking and Terrorism,” in Debating Civil Military Relations in Latin 
America, ed. David R. Mares and Rafael Martinez (Eastborne, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2014), 143. 
6 
Westerman illustrates the links and civil-military relationships between state military 
forces, civilian ministries (Justice, Defense, Parliament, and so forth), political parties, 
media, non-governmental organizations, and victims’ groups to help create an accountable 
security and justice system.18  Maintaining and strengthening these relationships across 
society is crucial to successful security sector reform.  
2. Critical Elements for Successful Security Sector Reform: Local 
Ownership 
Another group of scholars agrees on the importance of local ownership of security 
sector reconstruction to ensure the process is successful. As Eleanor Gordon, Albrecht 
Schnabel, David Law, and Timothy Donais stress, the local population, beyond just the 
political elites and state-level authorities, must be engaged in the planning process and 
should feel empowered to challenge the state as the process continues.19  The author 
justifies her conclusion by noting that especially after periods of extended conflict, the 
relationship between the people and the state needs to be re-established or rebuilt, and the 
government and security sector often need to regain public trust and confidence.20  In her 
view, if the local population is involved in the decision-making process of security sector 
reform, researchers found the process to better resonate with the population and its 
everyday experiences compared to solutions devised by and imposed by external actors.21  
Sedra even found a negative correlation between the scale of external donor assistance or 
aid and the impact achieved by security sector reform programming, further demonstrating 
how local populations responded more positively to domestic policies/solutions to 
                                                 
18 Westerman, “Too Much Western Bias? The Need for a More Culturally Adaptable Approach to 
Security Sector Reform,” 284–285. 
19 Eleanor Gordon, “Security Sector Reform, Statebuilding and Local Ownership: Securing the State 
or its People?” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 8, no. 2 (Aug 2014): 129–131, https://doi.org/
10.1080/17502977.2014.930219  
20 Gordon, “Security Sector Reform, Statebuilding and Local Ownership: Securing the State or its 
People?” 129. 
21 Gordon, “Security Sector Reform, Statebuilding and Local Ownership: Securing the State or its 
People?” 133 
7 
reform.22  Sedra’s research, citing arguments from Barnyi and Salahub, discussed how the 
security sector reform “model has faltered in high-profile, geostrategically important cases 
featuring extensive external engagement. In more stable contexts…where international 
engagement is less politically charged and more modest in scale, better success has been 
achieved.”23  David Law also explored certain cases where international involvement in 
the reform process resulted in a slow return of security sector ownership to the national 
government and consequently resulted in a lack of domestic  ability to sustain the reform.24  
In cases where external actors are providing assistance, Nicole Ball explained the need for 
those actors to “build on what exists locally and take local leadership seriously,” stating 
how the reform process should be a partnership and not exclusively driven by external 
actors.25 
Within the context of local ownership, scholars emphasize the importance of 
reconfiguring power relationships between governors and the governed, claiming change 
is more likely and sustainable when the governed have the agency to contribute to the 
process.26  Schnabel and Ehrhardt emphasize how throughout the reform process, “the 
conduct of security policy and management of security matters should be handled in a 
consultative and transparent manner, and should encourage a high level of parliamentary 
and public participation,” ensuring the reform meets the country’s and citizens’ needs and 
is in line with national development goals.27  In agreement with Schnabel, Ehrhardt, and 
                                                 
22 Mark Sedra, “Adapting Security Sector Reform to Ground-Level Realities: The Transition to a 
Second-Generation Model,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 12, no. 1 (Feb 2018): 48–63, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2018.1426383  
23 Sedra, “Adapting Security Sector Reform to Ground-Level Realities: The Transition to a Second-
Generation Model,” 60 
24 David Law, “Security Sector (Re)Construction in Post-Conflict Settings,” International 
Peacekeeping 13, no. 1 (Aug 2006): 119–121, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310500424884 
25 Nicole Ball, “Good Practices in Security Sector Reform,” (presentation, Bonn International Center 
for Conversion, Bonn, Germany, June 2000), 18. 
26 Timothy Donais, “Security Sector Reform and the Challenge of Vertical Integration,” Journal of 
Intervention and Statebuilding 12, no. 1 (Feb 2018): 32, https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2018.1426681  
27 Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhardt, “Post-Conflict Societies and the Military: 
Recommendations for Security Sector Reform,” in Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peace-
Building, ed. Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), 
316–317. 
8 
other scholars, the Geneva Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) 
highlights how local leadership support and involvement is essential for security sector 
reform success, stating how there must be a vested interest in the reform plan from the top 
centers of government down to local sectors.28 
Ultimately, as revealed by the literature, the most sustainable reform plans are 
driven by citizens inside the country, as they are building and dedicated to a plan they 
created based on their own needs and requirements.  Furthermore, Gordon argues 
“integrating community-based structures could help promote more substantive and 
inclusive local ownership: people would be better able to influence decisions about their 
own security; policy decisions would more likely be predicated upon the concerns and 
priorities articulated at the community level,” agreeing how local ownership persists as 
local needs are met in the overall security sector reform process.29  Donais describes a 
reform process with vertical integration: establishing a chain of relationships between 
international, national, and local actors into all phases of the process.30  With this vertical 
integration, he stresses, there can be a shift in focus from international actors contributing 
short-term interventions to a more domestically-owned, -driven, and -executed long-term 
plan, with international actors able to provide supplemental support if needed and 
requested.31   
Since much of scholars’ thoughts on local ownership of security sector reform focus 
on the agency and inclusion of local populations, they see a risk of the powerful elite 
dominating the process and keeping less privileged or remotely located populations from 
being represented and involved, hence advocating for reducing the power of the elites in 
the reform process.32  Scholars emphasize that most elites will not embrace this shift; but 
                                                 
28 Schnabel and Ehrhardt, “Post-Conflict Societies and the Military: Challenges and Problems of 
Security Sector Reform,” 6. 
29 Gordon, “Security Sector Reform, Statebuilding and Local Ownership: Securing the State or its 
People?” 141. 
30 Donais, “Security Sector Reform and the Challenge of Vertical Integration,” 39. 
31 Donais, 44. 
32 Donais, 32. 
9 
their willingness to cooperate is key for long-term success.33  “National elites use the 
security sector to support and preserve their positions of power,” and can be reluctant to 
involve themselves in a reform process that decreases that power and authority.34  Donais 
deems it critical to reconcile any tensions between the elites and local population regarding 
security governance: roles must be delineated and clear to all involved parties, and there 
often needs to be a shift in focus to align the steps of reform with the everyday priorities 
of the general population.35 
With their collective prioritization of local ownership as a key piece of successful 
security sector reform, certain scholars and United States military planners also emphasize 
the premise of keeping reform programs culturally relevant and relevant to a specific state’s 
natural leadership structure. Indeed, as Westerman notes, while the goal for many security 
sector reforms is to imitate the relationships between civil governments and military forces 
found in most Western, liberal-democratic states, there often needs to be a balance between 
this Western “ideal” model and the pre-established relationship of the military (and 
remainder of the security sector) in politics, government, and society within a country.36  
U.S. military handbooks on security sector reform also urge security sector reform policy-
makers to avoid eliminating “functioning formal and informal systems that do not fit the 
western ideal,” as existing systems that are viewed as beneficial and worthwhile by the 
local population are often easier to sustain than new, complex westernized systems that the 
locals may see as alien or illogical.37     
                                                 
33 Gordon, “Security Sector Reform, Statebuilding and Local Ownership: Securing the State or its 
People?” 141. 
34 Hans Born, “Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments: Insights from Comparative 
Analysis,” in Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments, ed. Hans Born and Albrecht Schnabel 
(Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for Control of Armed Forces, 2009), 250. https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/
default/files/publications/documents/YEARBOOK_2009.pdf 
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3. Critical Elements for Successful Security Sector Reform: Inclusion of 
Women 
In addition to highlighting local ownership in the security sector reform process, 
many scholars advocate for the inclusion of women in the reform process, not only pushing 
for their involvement in decision-making and re-structuring, but also encouraging their 
integration into the sector itself in leadership positions or military roles.38 Scholars argue 
that the value of including women in the reform process is that women are familiar with 
communal needs, due to their active role in the community in many societies, and can thus 
advocate for social spending on local requirements that positively impact security within 
local areas.39 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
agrees, and even created a handbook to address policy guidance for the inclusion of women 
in the security sector reform process, encouraging increased implementation of gender 
equality measures.40  Furthermore, according to Holvikivi, as a country rebuilds its 
security sector and attempts to regain trust from the population, the security sector “must 
be accountable to the entire population – including both women and men…and must be 
held accountable for violations of rights of citizens, including sexual and gender-based 
violence.”41 Holvikivi advocates for equitable participation from both women and men in 
the reform process, claiming that will enable more efficiency and effectiveness.42  
Furthermore, as Anderlini and Albrecht note, women are able to assist with community 
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policing to improve local security and help reduce crime.43 Indeed, as Fakondo highlights, 
women can work through local community groups to raise awareness on violence and 
discrimination and to advocate for security measures to maintain communal order 
throughout the reform process.44  Finally, addressing the needs of women in addition to 
men in the reform process helps widen the range of issues the security sector can 
encompass in the reform process, and gives additional perspectives to better develop 
effective strategies for long-term success.45  According to Holvikivi, while this fact is 
widely acknowledged by scholars, it is not universally implemented in reform processes 
across the globe, due to both gender inequality and the fact that most security institutions 
historically “have been designed by and for men”.46 In summary, the role of women in 
security sector reform, especially in countries recovering from internal or external conflict 
is a key consideration during the reform process and many scholars see the benefits in their 
inclusion.  
4. Critical Elements for Successful Security Sector Reform: Long-Term 
Planning 
Along with the development of local agency and direction for the security sector 
reform process, scholars consistently highlight the need for processes with an eye on long-
term results rather than a quick solution without staying power. In this connection, Gordon 
urges that international donors and participants in the reform process must “embrace the 
complexity and longevity of peacebuilding endeavors, including SSR, and ensure those 
actors who engage locals at the community level are provided with the financial and 
political support required.”47  As the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed 
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Forces (DCAF) mentions, failure to develop a long-term strategy and to be patient as 
reform slowly takes hold could leave policy-makers and individuals involved in the process 
disappointed with the lack of short-term results.48  Sedra agrees, and notes that decades of 
conflict will not have a quick fix as power dynamics shift within a country during the 
security sector reform process, and the pressures of planning within a short timeline and 
desiring quantitative results can be the downfall of sustainable programming.49  All in all, 
as Sedra notes, failing to allow time for the long-term reform process to take hold can be 
detrimental to countries recovering from conflict, as “given the potential of SSR processes 
to distort local power and political dynamics, half-hearted or prematurely concluded SSR 
interventions can do tremendous harm.”50   
Scholars tend to agree on the long timelines for full security sector reforms, 
especially in countries recovering from conflict.  Many of the ways DCAF measures 
security sector reforms all require years or decades of monitoring in order to determine the 
degree of success. These scholars posit that these measures of success include a reduction 
in violence, economic growth, public confidence in the security sector, improved 
professionalism, and local ownership of the security sector.51  Abandoning plans because 
immediate progress is not evident in those categories could result in a loss of future 
stability. Scholars, including Sedra, Donais, and Piotukh  see security sector reform as an 
evolutionary process, “in which state agencies ‘have the long-term capability and 
incentives to change in response to signals from society;’” the process is dynamic and will 
continually shift based on society’s developing needs.52  Piotukh and Wilson emphasize 
the need for long term planning in order for countries to have a strategic outlook and ability 
to plan for different contingencies and scenarios that may come up throughout the reform 
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process to improve its chances for success.53 Thus, academics stress the importance of  
addressing and fixing the “structural causes of insecurity,” a part of the overall longer-term 
process.54  Where some scholars disagree, however, is the level of emphasis placed on 
immediate security over more long-term strategic interests. In this context, Sedra also 
advocates for international peacekeeping missions as a way to support nations undergoing 
post-conflict security sector reform, believing the peacekeeping forces can provide a 
security “buffer” while the nation devotes its own domestic resources to the more long-
term, strategic plan.55  Sedra further posits that alleviating that pressure from domestic 
security institutions will stop “the preoccupation with ‘hard security,’” and bringing in 
outside agents to cover the peacekeeping issue will provide enough stability for the state 
as it recovers from conflict and commits to structural change.56  He explicitly does not see 
post-conflict reconstruction as a means to domestically address immediate security 
threats.57   
5. Critical Elements for Successful Security Sector Reform: Security 
Provision and Human Rights 
Other scholars, such as Hanggi, instead call upon countries redesigning their 
security sectors after conflicts to prioritize the immediate provision of public security in 
order to maintain stability and instill confidence in the general population.58  In post-
conflict scenarios, Hanggi specifically recommends peace-building as the key reform 
objective, with security being the critical problem. He notes the abundance of small arms 
and possible remaining pockets of armed resistance as key issues.59  Other scholars, 
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Eleanor Gordon in particular, agree with Hanggi that security should be prioritized, 
especially in the short term, and note how that prioritization needs to be conveyed to any 
external actors involved in the security sector reform process.60  Paul Jackson also iterates 
the need for providing immediate security in post-conflict environments in order to address 
the legacy of past conflict and create an environment able to support the reform process.61  
The best solution based on these two groups of ideas seems to be utilizing international 
actors for immediate peacekeeping and security provision, so the domestic government can 
prioritize and own the security sector reform process. This eliminates a slow turnover that 
can result from external actors driving the reform and the local government failing to accept 
the changes due to their lack of involvement in the process, as Law mentions.62  It also 
allows the population to feel safe in the short-term period after civil conflict, while 
permitting the government to focus on developing a sustainable strategic plan for reform. 
Another body of literature advocates for a special focus on addressing human rights 
violations, especially in countries restructuring their security sector after civil conflict. This 
is because, as Galletti and Wodzicki indicate, the violations were often committed by 
members of the security sector, so training is critical to ensure military, police, and 
intelligence forces do not continue those practices in the years after the conflict 
concludes.63  Galletti and Wodzicki further reveal that as the members of the security 
sector typically still retain significant power during the reform process, it can be difficult 
to allow their full participation in the re-structuring while still holding them accountable.64  
Toward this end, multiple scholars, including Jackson, Galletti and Wodzicki, push for 
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disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) to assist with holding members of 
the security sector accountable, and also for use while vetting future positions within the 
security sector.65  Galletti and Wodzicki point out the necessary adoption of military, 
police, and judicial reform programs and training in order to prevent future violations, and 
also urges for external oversight to ensure the security sector complies with human rights 
training throughout the reform.66  While scholars recognize the complexity of taking a 
human rights approach to security sector reform in post-conflict countries, they agree on 
the importance of incorporating human rights awareness and training into security sector 
reform.67  Along with holding members of the security sector accountable, academics also 
stress the importance that this focus on human rights within SSR also extends to ex-
combatants who may have been in conflict with the state because of the need to find a way 
to re-integrate them into society. Sean McFate from the United States Institute of Peace 
explains how incorporating ex-combatants into the new security sector can help strengthen 
peace settlements by “fostering mutual trust between former enemies, encouraging further 
disarmament and transition to civilian life.”68  Galletti and Wodzicki note, “the human 
rights approach would place ex-combatants, as well as the communities to which they 
return, as a vulnerable group worthy of special attention, notwithstanding the potential 
backlash that this would generate among people who did not take up arms and are just as 
poor.”69 To sum up, this group of scholars agrees that finding this balance between 
protecting and reintegrating former combatants but also caring for non-combatants who 
suffered and endured hardships for the duration of conflict is a challenge in post-conflict 
security sector reform that is critical to address for the program’s longevity. 
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6. Critical Elements for Successful Security Sector Reform: Balancing 
External Intervention 
A distinctive corpus of literature examines the role of external actors in the success 
of security sector reform programs. Certain scholars,  such as Law and Schnabel, see the 
benefits of external assistance, especially in countries conducting reform after conflict, as 
long as external actors have a strategic plan and ability to execute (or support) it long-term, 
have the necessary leadership structures, are prepared to invest significant resources and 
manpower, and had a legitimate right to enter the country to support the reform process.70  
Schnabel also addresses core tasks for external actors involved in a country’s security 
sector reform: ensuring the reform process and planning are on the right path towards 
success and ensuring the country has adequate resources and the proper training to sustain 
the reform process.71  Wilen concurs, suggesting the support of external actors for 
oversight, accountability, and also to confirm all parts of the security sector undergo the 
reform process – not just one portion.72 
Others, including Gordon, see external actors’ involvement as a hinderance to the 
premise of local ownership, especially if their plans are not in line with local community 
priorities.73  In this connection, in analyzing the role of the United States in providing 
external assistance to various countries undergoing security sector reform, Paul Jackson 
warns of the dangers of adopting a “one-size-fits-all” Western model for security sector 
reform, which can result in implementation failures or a lack of local ownership over 
carrying out the reform process.74  Eckhard warns of the dangers of external actors 
implementing their own political agenda on the reform process, which can inhibit local 
ownership due to the potential lack of commonalities between the nation reforming and the 
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countries providing assistance.75  Donais adds how external actors’ participation can result 
in security sector reform appearing as “an exercise in…social engineering, in which 
outsiders ‘teach’ local counterparts how to construct and manage a Western-style security 
sector…local actors…are not so much agents of transformation themselves as objects to 
be transformed.”76  Of the scholars who maintain that the external influence obstructs 
successful SSR, a select group posit that using external actors to supplement short-term 
needs, such as security provision, is more widely supported than attempting to fold them 
into a long-term strategic plan.77  Overall, the optimal solution based on scholars’ 
reasoning seems to be to utilize external actors as an oversight and accountability 
mechanism, but to encourage and facilitate local ownership of the actual planning and 
implementation process to the highest degree possible.   
7. Steps in Security Sector Reform 
One major debate among scholars is what constitutes the required steps of security 
sector reform, and—within this context—how to maintain democratic civilian control over 
the armed forces. Edmunds discusses what institutions constitute the security sector (e.g., 
military, police, intelligence, guerilla forces) , how ambitious the reform process should 
attempt to be, and how to balance human security over state security.78   Consequently, 
Edmunds advocates for a “holistic approach;” a reform approach that is democratic and in 
line with human rights protection and includes not only transforming the military, police, 
and intelligence agencies but also the “wider institutional complex,” including legal 
regulatory framework and oversight.79  He draws attention to four standards: 
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1. Develop a clear institutional framework for providing security that 
includes all relevant actors and focuses on the vulnerable 
2. Strengthen governance and oversight of security institutions 
3. Build capable, professional, and accountable security forces open to 
dialogue with civil society organizations 
4. Promote the sustainable delivery of justice and security80 
Bruneau and Matei agree with this “collaborative approach,” between the different 
elements of the security sector.81  They emphasize a broader idea of “a community whose 
members work together to achieve security,” and link these security efforts with 
democratization and the protection of human rights.82  Bruneau and Matei examine the 
dimensions of control and effectiveness of the military, police, and intelligence agencies.83   
In their view, the requirements for democratic civilian control of the security institutions 
involve “institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and professional norms…[including] 
a clear legal basis, ministries of defense, [policy and budget] committees in parliament, 
national security councils, [and] also the media, NGOs, and think tanks.”84  Their 
requirements for effectiveness fall into several categorical capabilities: fighting external 
and internal wars, combatting terrorism, confronting crime, providing humanitarian 
support, and carrying out peacekeeping operations.85  Their conceptual framework of civil-
military relations resembles Edmund’s SSR framework. 
8. Conclusion 
Based on the examination of multiple nations that have undergone democratization 
and security sector reform, scholars have outlined a number of aspects that have proven to 
be crucial to the programs’ ultimate success. As such, many academics agree that local 
ownership of the reform process is the key factor in the success of new security sectors, 
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and also emphasize the importance of developing a culturally relevant plan and model for 
each state’s security sector reconstruction, ensuring there is not a western bias in the 
process. Scholars also agree that security sector reform is often a long-term process that 
has few or no short-term measurable results and policy-makers thus must be patient in 
waiting for their reform plan to fully take effect over the post-conflict years (or decades). 
Nevertheless, scholars differ on their views on how to initially attack short-term security 
sector goals. Indeed, many emphasize the provision of immediate security over focusing 
all resources on strategic goals especially in states recovering from civil war or other 
internal conflicts. Others see a role for external actors to provide security to the general 
population while the host nation focuses on long-term reform goals. Both sides 
acknowledge how providing a sense of security to the general population also brings an 
increased attention to human rights protection, which many scholars see as a more difficult 
part of the security sector reconstruction process as there were often human rights 
violations committed by members of the security sector prior to the reform, and they must 
reshape how society views their role.  
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
To develop a model for Colombia’s post-conflict security sector, I hypothesize that 
Colombia’s SSR should follow the frameworks proposed by Edmunds as well as Matei and 
Bruneau. Specifically, I posit the civilian elites in Colombia should strive for 
institutionalizing democratically accountable and transparent, as well as effective, security 
institutions—military, police, and intelligence agencies. Toward this end, I hypothesize 
that Colombia’s security sector will need to place great emphasis on domestic ownership 
in order to be successful at ensuring long-term peace and stability within the country. Since 
the violent conflict has largely died down with the signing of the 2016 peace accords, 
currently there is likely less of a need for external sources of peacekeepers to provide 
internal security. However, external aid, as was given by the United States in Plan 
Colombia, would likely supplement Colombian efforts to design a revamped training 
program for the security sector. Furthermore, external support could assist with oversight 
of the reform process, ensuring adequate human rights training is given to all members of 
the security sector. 
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With many external actors concerned about Colombia’s long-term stability, I 
hypothesize that it would be difficult to balance external influence on the security sector 
reform plan with a desire for a locally-developed agenda. External actors, especially the 
United States, may be too focused on achieving short-term results to increase regional 
stability in light of Venezuela’s growing unrest, which could result in a reform without 
longevity. If external actors take too much control in the reform planning process or initial 
implementation, this could also result in Colombians failing to take ownership and 
maintain the measures put in place for reform. 
Another possibility is for Colombia to look at ways to incorporate previous FARC 
members into the security sector. Successful integration of FARC members into the 
security sector would likely require extensive planning in order to ensure their acceptance, 
as well as adherence to the reform plan in place. This plan would likely take years to fully 
implement, and several additional years to measure in terms of sustained success based on 
decreasing levels of violence and human rights abuses in the country. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN  
This research project will involve the examination and analysis of theoretical 
studies on security sector reforms and empirical research (case studies to determine which 
aspects of previous reforms have been most effective and would lend themselves well to 
Colombia’s post-conflict situation). The majority of the sources examined will be 
secondary sources examining how security sector reform has been successfully completed 
and maintained, but I will incorporate any primary sources on effective training or personal 
experiences with the planning process as able. 
To better develop a model for Colombia’s post-conflict security sector, two cases 
of security sector reform will be utilized: Sri Lanka and El Salvador. The case of Sri Lanka 
is key to study because it shared many key elements with Colombia: concerns with prior 
human rights violations during the civil conflict, a lack of security sector accountability, 
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and a need to incorporate radical groups into the political sphere.86  Like Colombia, Sri 
Lanka endured decades of civil conflict that disrupted the economy and destabilized the 
nation. Sri Lanka is an especially useful case to examine because the reform process was 
an overall failure, mainly due to the political dynamics at the time of reform, and Colombia 
can learn from these missteps when implementing its own security sector reform.87   It 
constitutes an estimating case, in accordance with John Gerring’s case study selection 
logic: the two countries share a number of similar background factors, and can be used as 
an exploratory case to investigate what leads to successful and unsuccessful reforms.88 
While El Salvador’s reform process was praised as a success by many experts 
outside the country by the late 1990s, many within the country saw it as lacking due to a 
failure to eradicate crime groups that formed after the civil war ended.89  Examining why 
El Salvador’s reforms were initially successful but failed to manifest in long-term results 
can help Colombia avoid similar issues in its post-conflict process. El Salvador falls into 
the category of exploratory case, with similar background factors to Colombia and a similar 
immediate outcome as the one Colombia desires, but long-term results were less 
desirable.90  By further examining how these countries restructured their military, 
intelligence, and police sectors after similar civil conflicts, conclusions can better be drawn 
as to how Colombia’s needs would best be met based on successes and failures from these 
two cases. Measures of success for these case studies will include the areas the DCAF 
focuses on for quantifying security sector reform success: reductions of violence, economic 
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growth, improved professionalism, local ownership of the security sector, and public 
confidence.91 
By examining Colombia’s security sector’s history and analyzing the sources of 
conflict as well as the country’s current status several years after peacekeeping and cease-
fire agreements have been signed, the country’s individual needs for optimal security sector 
reform will be better understood. Incorporating those needs into theoretical approaches of 
successful and necessary practices for reform, with the case studies as further evidence to 
see how theoretical approaches and empirical research were effectively (or ineffectively) 
executed, will help design an ideal model for Colombia’s security sector reform.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will begin with an introduction to Colombia’s security sector and civil 
conflict, and will summarize current scholarly views on security sector reform practices. 
The second chapter will detail Colombia’s conflict resolution and provide an overview of 
the security sector in post-conflict Colombia. The third and fourth chapters will provide an 
overview of post-conflict security sector reform in El Salvador and Sri Lanka, respectively. 
The fifth chapter will provide a comparative analysis of the case studies,  summarize 
findings, and provide recommendations for Colombia’s security sector reform. 
I. Introduction and Literature Review 
II. Case Study: Colombia 
III. Case Study: El Salvador 
IV. Case Study: Sri Lanka 
V. Conclusion: Analysis, Findings and Recommendations 
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II. CASE STUDY: COLOMBIA 
In order to best develop a model for Colombia’s post-conflict security sector 
transformation, it is first necessary to understand the origins of the decades-long conflict 
between the government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a leftist guerrilla organization. This 
chapter will discuss the background of the conflict, Colombia’s security sector and its role 
during the conflict, as well as initial reforms that have been made to the security sector 
since the peace agreements were signed.  
A. BACKGROUND – FARC AND CIVIL CONFLICT 
Colombia was embroiled in conflicts throughout much of the second half of the 
twentieth century. The FARC’s initial beginnings stemmed from conflicts over land reform 
between the Liberals (which the FARC initially broke off from) and Conservatives in 
Colombia in the 1930s and 1940s.92  Initial conflicts became more violent when the 
government began to supply the Conservatives with weapons, hoping this would help 
dissuade or eliminate opposition and would help maintain conservative political power; 
left-leaning peasants thus armed themselves and formed their own small army to defend 
themselves.93  After several decades of military operations and minor conflicts, the left-
leaning members retreated further into the jungles and foothills of the Andes, forming their 
own bases for refuge and ultimately coming together to found the FARC in 1964. In 
addition to the FARC, other guerilla opposition groups formed in Colombia in the 1960s: 
the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the People’s Liberation Army (EPL), further 
adding to the conflict dividing Colombia. 
                                                 
92 Alfred Molano, “The Evolution of the FARC: A Guerrilla Group’s Long History,” North American 
Congress on Latin America, last modified September 25, 2007, https://nacla.org/article/evolution-farc-
guerrilla-groups-long-history. 
93 Molano, “The Evolution of the FARC: A Guerrilla Group’s Long History.”  
24 
The FARC grew quickly during the 1970s and early 1980s, with their numbers 
skyrocketing from several hundred in 1970 to over 3,000 by 1982.94  They adopted a 
hierarchical leadership structure with a centralized command, as well as training programs 
for new members.95  To fund the group’s existence, the FARC began embracing the profits 
of growing coca as well as gold mining, kidnapping, and extortion.96  The FARC initially 
relied on kidnapping politicians and elites for income in the 1970s and 1980s, with 
kidnapping continuing until the early 2000s.97  Later, the FARC focused finance efforts 
on coca, a hardy, high profit plant, by charging a “protection tax” to the farmers who grew 
it.98  As profits grew, their numbers swelled, and the FARC’s violence continued despite 
early attempts at peace negotiations by President Belisario Betancur (1982-1986).99   
Opposing the FARC and other leftist groups were a series of right wing paramilitary 
groups, growing from government decrees and laws in the mid-1960s that provided “legal 
foundations for the creation of civil defense organizations through presidential order.”100  
The paramilitary groups gradually expanded to become a military-like force, supported by 
right-wing politicians, wealthy ranchers and agribusinesses who used them as personal 
protection.101  One of the most prominent right-wing paramilitary groups was the 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, or United Self-Defenders of Colombia (AUC), which 
was a larger organization that included several regional paramilitaries. The AUC was 
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formed in 1997 by three brothers who had formerly served in Pablo Escobar’s drug cartel, 
and originally formed to defend its territory for drug trafficking but evolved to combat the 
FARC and other leftist organizations.102  Other paramilitary groups developed through 
funding from wealthy landowners and businessmen who needed their protection from the 
rebel groups. Despite being banned by 1990, paramilitary groups like the AUC in Colombia 
continued to grow due to a lack of oversight from the government and also in response to 
the sustained expansion of the FARC, dramatically adding to the civil conflict in Colombia.  
B. PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND PLAN COLOMBIA 
Early negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC in the 1980s 
were largely unsuccessful due to a failure to re-integrate the FARC into society as a 
political party. It was not until 2012 under the Santos administration (2010-2018) that 
peace talks began to resume and make significant headway, partially due to President 
Álvaro Uribe’s campaigns in the years prior. President Uribe (2002-2010) greatly increased 
the size of the Colombian military and led a campaign against the FARC and other guerrilla 
groups in Colombia, reducing FARC numbers by over half and launching military raids on 
members who held leadership roles within the group.103  President Uribe also focused on 
targeting the FARC’s income from drug trafficking: going after coca fields, laboratories, 
and actual drug smugglers.104  As a result of Uribe’s efforts, kidnappings dropped by 
eighty percent and homicides dropped by forty percent during his term.105   
President Uribe was also key in finishing what his predecessor, President Andrés 
Pastrana (1998-2002), had begun: a plan for peace in Colombia that involved aid and 
support from the United States. Plan Colombia involved economic, financial, military, 
human rights protection, social participation, counternarcotic, development, and peace 
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strategies for Colombia, with a large portion of the money from the United States dedicated 
to the military and counternarcotic strategy pieces of the Plan.106  Ultimately, Plan 
Colombia helped Colombia to invest over one billion dollars annually into their military 
component, with a focus on reducing cocaine production through aerial spraying of coca 
plantations.107     
The Plan’s efforts to eradicate coca as a source of income for many of the groups 
driving conflict within the country had mixed results. Despite aerial fumigation prompting 
an initial decrease in production from 2000 to 2003, the amount of coca grown remained 
fairly steady and even increased until around 2008 when manual eradication began to be 
used to a greater extent.108  Nonetheless, Plan Colombia’s financial support and President 
Uribe’s campaign against the FARC both helped pave the way for peacemaking 
negotiations over the past decade. 
With Plan Colombia in full swing, President Santos’ 2012 peace talks involved 
discussions about the FARC’s future political participation and re-integration into civilian 
life,  as well as disarmament, reparations, and illegal crop eradication.109  President Santos 
also pledged billions of dollars on development in rural areas to help develop economic 
alternatives to the drug trade.110  In mid-2016, the Colombian government and FARC 
signed a cease-fire, and in September of the same year the FARC leader signed a peace 
agreement.111  However, the peace treaty was short-lived: Colombians rejected it one week 
later in a nationwide referendum, claiming rebels were being treated with too much 
leniency, and should not be able to run for elected office as the treaty permitted. Overall, 
many Colombian citizens were divided over the peace agreements: some thought the 
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FARC should be punished for the decades of conflict and the crime and unrest they 
contributed to in Colombia, while others understood the impossibility of fully reintegrating 
the FARC into society without some degree of amnesty.  
An updated peace agreement was approved by Colombia’s Congress in December 
2016, better defining punishments for former FARC members and banning them from 
running for office in “former conflict zones.”112  Six months later, the FARC “formally 
ended existence as an armed group,” although some dissidents of the group remained active 
and continued to fight Colombian armed forces in remote areas.113  However, with the 
signing of the November 2016 peace agreement, the security sector of Colombia has 
already begun planning out reform efforts. The Colombian military has set out a plan to 
shift focus to defending democracy, combatting illegal drug trafficking, respecting the 
environment and conservation efforts, multinational cooperation, and supporting 
socioeconomic and cultural development and human rights protection.114  Throughout 
2017 and 2018, President Santos also held peace talks with the ELN, hoping for a similar 
outcome as the FARC agreements and striving to fully end civil conflict in Colombia.115 
Instead of implementing a traditional model of disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration (DDR), the FARC sought transformation into a political party which would 
enable them to continue advocating for their causes through alternative, peaceful means.  
C. POST-CONFLICT CHALLENGES 
The conflict resolution and peace settlement process between the Colombian 
government and the left-wing FARC is helping reduce civil conflict in Colombia and is 
expected to boost economic growth, but Colombia still has a number of residual issues 
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arising from the decades of fighting. With the FARC no longer needing to pursue drug 
trafficking as a source of income, they left behind a large void in the country’s drug 
network. Criminal groups, known as BACRIM or “bandas criminales,” are rushing to fill 
the void and continue profiting from coca growth and trafficking in Colombia. These 
groups are made up of former mid-level leaders from paramilitary groups and while they 
may have lost some of the right-wing ideology, they are “driven instead by financial self-
interest and the desire to monopolize Colombia’s most profitable drug-trafficking 
routes.”116  One of the largest groups, with between 1,300 and 2,000 members, Los 
Urabenos, was formed from former paramilitary groups. It has both national and 
international influence: it works with Mexican drug traffickers to move drug products 
through Central and into North America.117  According to Ince, the BACRIMs are 
concentrated in small parts of Colombian territory (about ten percent of the overall 
territory) but the groups sometimes compete for territory or positioning in the drug 
trafficking arena, contributing to further insecurity and conflict in the country.118 
In addition to the instability caused by criminal bands in Colombia, previous FARC 
members who failed to disarm (or new members drawn to their ideology or tactics) have 
begun taking up residence in some of the more rural and isolated parts of the country, 
calling themselves the “new FARC.”119  These members do not wish to adhere to the 
cease-fire or peacekeeping agreements made with the Colombian government, and some 
blame the government for failing to bring health, education, and infrastructure 
improvements to the rural areas previously held by the FARC.120  While their numbers are 
still much smaller than the FARC’s were at its stronger points over the past two decades, 
Nicholas Casey and Federico Rios Escobar estimate there could still be close to 3,000 of 
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these “dissident FARC fighters” – equal to approximately forty percent of the number in 
the group prior to the peace deal.121  These numbers could grow if the government fails to 
implement the rural infrastructure reforms and expansions it promised as more and more 
isolated Colombians feel they need a way to get their voice heard and have their needs met. 
A large challenge facing the Colombian government is the successful reintegration 
of former FARC members, to prevent dissident groups like the “new FARC” from forming 
and plunging the nation back into chaos. With the country divided over punishments for 
former FARC members in the peace settlements, Colombian presidents have worked to 
find a balanced way of politically integrating the former FARC members to keep them 
from feeling alienated and resorting to rebellion. Many of the former FARC members also 
need some form of protection from the government against threats of violence from former 
right-wing paramilitary groups who are not as quick to forgive and forget the decades of 
conflict.122   
Ince argues that it is critical for the Colombian government to understand the 
dynamics of the FARC and how it interacts with criminal groups across the country. This 
would enable the government to assess the relative strength and potential power shifts of 
other groups looking to take over the FARC’s former territory after the FARC 
demobilizes.123  Overall, Ince sees strong state institutions and investments in human 
capital as two of the most essential tasks for the Colombian government in order to ensure 
the country moves forward from the civil conflict and does not suffer a relapse.124  With 
that comes finding employment opportunities and political roles for the prior FARC 
members as they are reoriented and reintroduced to Colombian society. 
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D. COLOMBIA’S SECURITY SECTOR 
1. Introduction 
Colombia’s police, military, and intelligence agencies were also active in fighting 
the insurgents, with their orders coming directly from the executive and lacking oversight 
from other branches of government.125  Due to the FARC’s tactics of hiding out in the 
mountains and jungles, the military and police struggled to eradicate them from the 
country, and did rely on support from paramilitary groups to also help target the insurgents. 
As the FARC’s numbers swelled and they mounted increasing numbers of attacks, the 
Colombian police and military sacrificed accountability and human rights protections for 
rapid response and large-scale massacres in their attempts to combat the guerrillas.126   
2. Intelligence 
The Colombian Intelligence Service, or SIC, was established in 1953 and later 
transitioned to become the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) in 1960, with an 
expanded mission set to include police missions (crime investigation, arrests, and 
maintaining public order).127  Due to the decades of conflict, Colombian intelligence 
services typically had larger budgets and greater access to resources than other Latin 
American intelligence services as they were “anchored in the Colombian political system, 
rather than…an apolitical state agency.”128  Nonetheless, DAS was linked to paramilitary 
groups, using them as “hit squads” to murder political opposition and insurgents.129  The 
AUC frequently carried out DAS (as well as Colombian military) requests to kill lists of 
academics, teachers, and trade unionists thought to be connected to or a part of the FARC, 
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according to Swenson and Venegas Gonzalez.130  When discovered, this collusion 
between DAS and AUC greatly tarnished the agency’s reputation and decreased public 
support for Colombia’s intelligence and political leadership.  
Further affecting DAS’ credibility was a series of scandals during the Uribe 
administration. Despite efforts by the Colombian Ministry of Defense under President 
Álvaro Uribe to reduce the scope of DAS’ activities and responsibilities in the mid-2000s 
and to limit them to intelligence and counter-intelligence roles aligned with political 
priorities, reports came out that DAS had been overseeing surveillance of the Uribe 
administration’s political rivals.131  Furthermore, DAS had been monitoring Supreme 
Court justices under the pretense of “determining whether it [the Supreme Court] had been 
infiltrated by narcotraffickers.”132  DAS had become an organization more tied to 
supporting the presidency than the state, and its role in security remained murky and ill-
defined. The DAS Director, Maria Pilar Hurtado, eventually resigned due to this series of 
scandals, and four other DAS directors eventually followed suit after similar accusations 
and allegations.133  The organization continued to lose public support and legitimacy as an 
intelligence service, and it became evident more stringent guidance for the Colombian 
intelligence community was critical as the country recovered from civil conflict. 
Ultimately, as a response to the DAS spying scandals of the 2000s, President Juan Manuel 
Santos (2010-2018) dissolved DAS and replaced it with Direccion Nacional de Inteligencia 
(DNI), a smaller civilian organization focused on strategic intelligence instead of criminal 
investigations – with no police functions.134 
3. Democratic Reforms of Intelligence 
Several Colombian Presidents attempted to develop intelligence reforms and 
improved oversight laws, beginning in the 1990s. President Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) 
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re-organized the intelligence structure, creating the National Intelligence System (SINAI), 
intended to unify intelligence policy at the national level.135  However, SINAI proved to 
be ineffective because the military and intelligence members rarely met to share 
information. More changes were made by President Pastrana in the late 1990s, including 
significant advances in intelligence collection, analysis, and training across the military 
and civilian intelligence organizations.136  President Uribe created the Joint Intelligence 
Council (JIC) to unify intelligence organizations and outline specific organizational 
functions, but the series of DAS scandals during his presidency erased any progress the 
JIC may have made in collection and information sharing.137 
Intelligence oversight was not largely implemented in Colombia as the intelligence 
organizations operated under the executive branch without checks in power from the other 
branches. The executive branch offered little guidance during the conflict to the 
intelligence sector, focused instead on protecting the president and finding and eradicating 
insurgents as quickly as possible: “the high organizational centrality of the President in the 
Colombian intelligence system and the resulting politicization of the main intelligence 
agencies undermines both the legitimacy and effectiveness of Colombian intelligence […] 
the proximity between DAS and the President politicized it and focused its intelligence 
missions in the political survival of the President.”138  The legislative and judicial branches 
typically only examined the intelligence agencies after corruption scandals were brought 
forward; they did little during the conflict to prevent the scandals from occurring.139  
Colombia’s media served as a form of limited external oversight, mostly focused on human 
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rights violations and bringing that information forward to the general population to help 
hold the intelligence agencies accountable.140      
This lack of oversight was one of the largest root causes for many of the issues the 
Colombian intelligence sector faced during the later twentieth century and early twenty-
first century. Colombian intelligence services primarily served the president and 
themselves – not the Ministry of Defense – with high degrees of autonomy.141   
Consequently, much of their mission was politicized and intelligence resources were 
devoted to monitoring political opponents of the President and promoting electoral fraud 
to ensure certain candidates were elected.142  Finally, in the wake of several intelligence 
sector scandals surrounding election fraud and communications monitoring, President 
Uribe introduced new legal framework for reforming the intelligence sector in 2009. These 
limited roles and missions for intelligence operations, implemented an accountable 
intelligence budget, and included better procedures for information security.143  
Further legislation, including Law 1621, enacted in 2013, helped Colombian 
intelligence to ensure the agencies’ legitimacy, by addressing the intelligence agencies’ 
authorities, responsibilities, and release criteria.144  This oversight law helped refine and 
reform the focus and mission set of Colombian intelligence and aimed to eliminate their 
part in furthering the country’s civil conflict by affiliating or colluding with paramilitary 
groups or committing violations of privacy and human rights. That same year, the 
Commission to Monitor the Activities of Intelligence and Counterintelligence was formed, 
and this congressional committee aimed to oversee the intelligence sector for human rights 
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violations, corruption, excesses, and ensuring they maintain their appropriate roles and 
missions.145  This Commission could receive reports from Inspector Generals within 
national intelligence, military intelligence, and police intelligence.146   
Despite this legal accomplishment, Colombia’s intelligence agencies still face a 
number of issues that cloud their role in the security sector. In 2014, the head of military 
intelligence allowed unauthorized monitoring of government-FARC peace negotiations, 
resulting in his eventual relief from command.147  Colombian intelligence is also still 
working to build its legitimacy and ability to provide security to increase the amount of 
human intelligence, or HUMINT, it can capitalize on. This would allow Colombian 
intelligence to better draw defectors or dissenters in to provide information with a promise 
of security after the intelligence is provided. While FARC deserters have proven to be a 
valuable source of intelligence for Colombian intelligence services, more is still needed to 
exploit this resource.  
4. Police 
The police forces were created in 1891, to provide domestic security and law 
enforcement, but were often reorganized and restructured depending on the political party 
currently holding power.148   Colombia’s police forces have operated under the Ministry 
of Defense since 1953, and the Armed Services assumed many of the organization’s 
leadership positions throughout the twentieth century, a period often tied to extreme 
violence in the country (referred to as La Violencia). Finally, in the 1990s, the police forces 
came to be fully led and managed by police officers that had been trained by other police 
officers – instead of by military officers.149  Further separation between the police and 
military came in 1991 when a civilian was selected to lead the Ministry of Defense, and 
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the police used their newfound organizational independence, larger budget, and increased 
personnel to enhance their role against the drug trafficking that had simultaneously begun 
to run rampant.150   
With the police deeply involved in fighting drug trafficking in Colombia in the 
early 1990s, their numbers skyrocketed to seventy-six thousand members by 1992.151  
However, according to Gonzalez, much of this growth resulted in reduced training, lower 
standards for recruitment, and decreased oversight of the new police force members. 
Furthermore, despite their growing numbers, the police were ineffective: homicide rates 
quadrupled, corruption was rampant in the police force as it was often infiltrated by drug 
cartel members, and the police were heavily involved in human rights violations.152  Public 
trust in the police was eroded due to their violence against innocent citizens, and their 
popularity further sank after a series of scandals including the link of a Chief of Police to 
drug cartels, and the rape and murder of a young girl at a police station.153   
5. Democratic Reforms of the Police 
Popular distrust of the police force in Colombia has existed since their 
establishment in 1891.154  Despite the corruption and human rights violations plaguing the 
police forces in Colombia, politicians were slow to bring about substantial democratic 
reforms of the police forces, instead focusing efforts on the drug war and civil conflict with 
the FARC – which often resulted in further funding to the police forces. Colombia’s 
revamped 1991 Constitution “extended legal jurisdiction to the police in relation to actions 
carried out in service, despite also stating that the National Police is a permanent armed 
body of a civil nature” and identified “external security and public order” as the armed 
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forces areas of focus, which did little to explicitly differentiate the roles of the police and 
military forces.155  By 1999, through Plan Colombia, the Colombian police received over 
two billion dollars annually through United States’ funding, allowing them to further widen 
their scope of efforts.156  Police reform during the conflict was focused on improving 
coordination with the military forces and increasing the number of specialized units to 
combat drug trafficking.157  President César Gaviria (1990-1994) introduced a system of 
civilian supervision and oversight of the police forces in 1993, but much of the early 
civilian leadership faced defiance from the higher ranking police officers and had little 
actual control over the police.158   
With the signing of the peace agreements finally came the Police Reform Code in 
2017, which kept the police forces as part of the Ministry of Defense but expanded their 
role to include enforcement for low-level offences and the regulation of informal 
businesses.159  In addition, a specialized unit of three thousand police officers, the Police 
Unit for Peacebuilding, was established to monitor the progress of the peace agreements 
and demobilization and disarmament of combatants.160 
6. Military 
Colombia’s military consists of an Army, Navy, and Air Force, and has seen a 
variety of conflicts since its establishment, including involvement in both World War II 
and the Korean War. Since Colombia’s civil conflict has grown, the military’s role, 
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resources, and manpower have centered around counterinsurgency and halting drug 
trafficking in the country. 
7. Democratic Reforms of the Armed Forces 
Democratic reforms of the armed forces have attempted to bridge the gap between 
the armed forces and the civilian elites/society. Prior to the early 2000s when President 
Uribe was elected in Colombia, the civilians and military in government were largely 
separated: civilians handled economic and social policies, while the military was in charge 
of defense and security with little external oversight.161  Similar to the police forces, the 
military was given increased funding and a greater scope of responsibility and autonomy 
as the civil conflict escalated, often resulting in the targeting of unarmed civilians as the 
Colombian military sought to eliminate insurgent elements.162  Aviles writes of the 
Colombian military’s use of the military court system to avoid convicting military officers 
of human rights violations, essentially covering up their wrongdoings of “the massacre of 
unarmed civilians, the development of paramilitary squads, the selective assassinations of 
individual political leaders, and…human rights crimes.”163 
President César Gaviria (1990-1994), attempted to put together a commission to 
address reform within the military and the military justice system and to increase civilian 
oversight and influence, but his commission was made almost entirely of military members 
who ultimately failed to enact any reforms.164  His successor, President Ernesto Samper 
(1994-1998), pledged to prioritize the protection of human rights throughout his term, and 
created his own commission with equal civilian and military representation to address the 
military justice system and human rights violations.165  While his initial plans and 
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proposals seemed promising, Samper too failed to implement any real reforms and the 
military continued to operate with high levels of autonomy. 
The United States’ support of the Colombian military in the 1990s and early 2000s 
did little to decrease human rights violations. The United States “demand [ed] greater 
adherence of human rights while simultaneously supporting directly and indirectly central 
actors that perpetuated human rights violations. Even in those periods in which military aid 
was cut off from the Colombian armed forces because of human rights concerns, this 
duality was maintained.”166  Insufficient oversight of the military, both by the Colombian 
government and the United States, permitted the violations to continue. Furthermore, the 
Colombian military opposed signing any agreements with the United States that required 
their units to be “vetted for human rights violators” prior to receiving military aid and 
assistance, and defense ministers in Colombia were unable to convince the military to 
compromise until the dismissal of the then-commander of the armed forces, General Harold 
Bedoya, in 1997.167   
President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) finally began increasing civilian control of 
the armed forces when he replaced each of the military’s top generals, and his legacy 
continued when President Uribe developed a comprehensive Defense and Democratic 
Security Policy to give guidance to the military on their roles and missions.168  Boraz notes 
how after years of military autonomy, the number of civilians knowledgeable about 
military strategy and capabilities is lacking in Colombia, and it will take time to build up a 
credible civilian knowledge base. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Prior to the signing of the cease-fire agreements, the Justice and Peace Law enabled 
many of the paramilitary groups, especially the violent AUC, to dismantle and disarm with 
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promises of amnesty or reduced sentencing for cooperation, and no extradition for drug-
related crimes.169  The law was developed as part of President Uribe’s 2003 plan to 
demobilize the violent paramilitary groups involved in Colombia’s civil conflict, hoping it 
would be an initial step in the overall peace process and would lead to an end to human 
rights violations. While the demobilization and disarmament of the paramilitary groups did 
immediately lead to a reduction in homicides and displaced persons, the peace was short-
lived as many of the former paramilitary members joined new criminal groups in the years 
following the Justice and Peace Law. By 2009 these groups were active in 246 
municipalities in Colombia.170  Furthermore, Colombian citizens thought many of the 
sentences for former paramilitary members were too lenient; they believed paramilitary 
members were not held accountable for their human rights violations in favor of a more 
rapid reintegration into society.171  Arguably, a careful balance between effective 
reintegration and accountability for prior human rights violations may need to be reached 
as Colombia and its security sector address the demobilization of FARC members. 
More popularly received was the National Commission on Reparation and 
Reconciliation (CNRR), a part of the Justice and Peace Law that functions similar to a truth 
commission and guarantees victim rights to justice and reparations after civil conflict.172  
Colombia’s CNRR includes government representatives, victim representatives, and 
independent representatives from civil society, but it has been slow to execute its mission 
due to a lack of funding and a lack of “a culture of reparation and reconciliation in 
Colombia.”173  However, its effective implementation could prove critical in the security 
sector reform process as the various human rights violations committed throughout the 
duration of the civil conflict are addressed.174  For future reform efforts to be successfully 
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implemented and sustained, the popular views of reparation and reconciliation may need 
to be reshaped as members across all sides of the conflict are held accountable for their 
actions. 
Wolf Grabendorff addresses the lack of parliamentary oversight present in 
Colombia, describing this as a problem for the very limited security sector reform efforts 
of Colombia. Essentially, changes across Colombia’s government may need to occur as the 
peace process and security sector reform occur, creating distinctions between civilians and 
military, control and supervision of the security sector, as well as accountability 
measures.175  Believing in “the need to engage an external power in the process to 
guarantee the strengthening and modernizing of core security actors and advances in 
security management,” Grabendorff explains how historical and political conditions 
intrinsic to Colombia have and can be expected to continue to stunt security sector 
reform.176   
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III. CASE STUDY: EL SALVADOR  
In order to best recommend a model for Colombia’s security sector, it is useful to 
examine two case studies in order to analyze how their security sector reconstruction plans 
were successful and where they failed. El Salvador is a useful case to begin with because, 
like Colombia, a period of intense civil war resulted in human rights violations by both 
rebels and the government, and it was critical to both instill nationalism and unity across 
the population, and to rebuild trust in the government moving forward.   
El Salvador was ravaged by over a decade of civil war between 1979 and 1992, 
initiated by a coup by the Revolutionary Government Junta (JRG) in response to President 
Carlos Humberto Romero’s (1977-1979) repressive policies and the general loss of civil 
liberties.177  The military junta sought to suppress leftist Salvadoran guerrillas, known as 
the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN). The civil war was a 
period of repression, human rights violations and terror for much of the population by the 
military and police forces seeking to root out the guerrillas and any of their supporters, and 
the reconstruction that followed demanded immense changes be made to the country’s 
security sector. The United Nations was heavily involved in the reconstruction process as 
an oversight mechanism, which started in 1992 with the Chapultepec Peace Accords, but 
many of the reform processes have failed to have positive long-term results and led to a 
huge upsurge in crime and gang violence that continues to be prevalent today. Some 
scholars attribute these failures to the high amounts of external influence on both the civil 
conflict and the post-conflict reform process, blaming outside actors for shaping the 
country and failing to emphasize local ownership by the domestic government in the 
reconstruction efforts. 
A. CIVIL WAR AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
The beginning of El Salvador’s civil war can be traced to a coup in 1979 when 
President Romero was removed from office and replaced by a military-civilian junta. The 
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military actors overthrew the government with the intention of enacting a number of social 
and economic reforms.178  However, the coup ignited a civil conflict between the leftist 
and rightist movements. On one side was President Duarte and the military, forming a 
political party known as the Partido Democrata Cristiano (PDC), and on the other were 
guerrilla groups uniting to form the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional 
(FMLN).179  The FMLN, government, and many paramilitary groups (which came to be 
known as death squads due to their violent tactics) clashed throughout the 1980s, with 
civilians ending up largely in the cross-fire of these conflicts.180  Thirty thousand people 
were reportedly killed by the right-wing death squads just in the early years of the conflict, 
from 1979–1981, and over seventy-five thousand were killed over the twelve-year civil 
war.181182  Human rights violations—including many massacres of civilians—were 
routine during the civil conflict as the Salvadoran military took a scorched earth approach, 
attempting to eradicate any support for the FMLN rebels by attacking peasants in rural 
areas.183 
Against this background, the United States was fearful of El Salvador falling to 
Communism if the leftist FMLN was victorious; therefore, the U.S. government provided 
immense support to the government in the form of financial aid and military equipment.184  
Aware of the Salvadoran military’s human rights violations, some of the military 
equipment initially came with several conditions: the intense violence and repression 
needed to be denounced and stopped through improved command and control and the 
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replacement of abusive senior officers and military officers.185  The Salvadoran military 
opposed these “reforms enforced by another country,” and ultimately ignored them.186   
This resulted in a multi-year cycle where the United States offered military aid under the 
condition that human rights were protected in El Salvador but ultimately put very little 
pressure on the Salvadoran government and failed to enforce the conditions.187  Torn 
between the vicious human rights violations taking place but also fearing a Communist 
overthrow or economic disaster brought upon El Salvador by FMLN success, the United 
States government ultimately continued to provide support to the military government.188  
With this support, the military in El Salvador tripled in number to include fifty-six thousand 
members, assisted by U.S. military trainers who shared counterinsurgency tactics and 
instructions on how to operate the military equipment the U.S. had provided.189   
The conflict intensified throughout the 1980s, with many civilians either caught in 
the crosshairs of each side’s aggressive offensives or displaced from their homes and 
villages and forced to relocate. In 1990, Salvadoran President Alfredo Cristiani (1989-
1994) began negotiations with the FMLN and the UN, hoping to end military hostilities as 
FMLN offensives grew more aggressive.190  Both sides signed a United Nations 
Agreement on Human Rights in 1990, but the fighting continued until the final peace 
agreement, mediated by the United Nations, was signed in 1992.   
B. PEACE AGREEMENTS AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION 
The Chapultepec Peace Accords finally ended the civil war in El Salvador in 1992 
when a cease-fire was signed between the FMLN and Salvadoran government. The peace 
accords aimed to restructure the nation’s security sector, re-integrate ex-combatants from 
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both sides, and ultimately recognized the FMLN as a political party.191  Agreements also 
permitted former FMLN members to join the new police forces, known as the Policía 
Nacional Civil (PNC), but restricted them from joining the Salvadoran military.192  
Crucially, as Negroponte outlines, the Salvadoran armed forces were also moved under 
civilian leadership in the Ministry of Defense, and paramilitary groups were disbanded. 
Furthermore, the agreements established a commission to investigate the wartime activities 
and potential transgressions of the military, and to vet current and future military 
members.193  These agreements were established over the course of several meetings 
between FMLN and Salvadoran government members, but were ultimately drafted by the 
United Nations, and failed to specify the exact method for reintegrating the FMLN 
members into society or providing them with training, land, or credit.194 
Like other countries undergoing post-conflict reconstruction, in the immediate 
aftermath of the conflict El Salvador was plagued by weak institutions, a lack of 
government transparency, and a devasted economy and infrastructure, which made it 
highly dependent upon external aid for recovery.195  El Salvador’s main post-conflict 
priorities, as included in the peace agreements, were infrastructure reconstruction, 
restoration of basic social services, attending to those affected by the conflict, reintegrating 
combatants, and fueling economic growth.196  While the negotiating process had outlined 
a need for ex-combatant reintegration, there was no explicit plan in place in the final peace 
accords, yet it was clear this was a crucial step to ensure lasting peace and stability and to 
keep former FMLN members from taking up arms again against the government. 
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With these priorities, El Salvador’s reform process initially focused largely on 
economic measures as part of a larger framework known as the National Reconstruction 
Plan (NRP).197  This two billion dollar plan hoped to address “the most immediate needs 
of the population hardest hit by the conflict [including] the development of former zones 
of conflict.” 198  In this context, the Plan included provisions to transfer land to former 
combatants and FMLN members.199  The NRP led to a six percent Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth in the first five years of its implementation (1992-1997), and resulted in 
significant reform in El Salvador’s trade systems, fueling economic stability while the 
government focused on ensuring security and peace between civilians and former 
combatants.200 
The NRP also re-structured the security sector to include the new civil police, now 
separate from the military and titled the National Civilian Police, or PNC.201   The 
Salvadoran military was reduced and put under the Minister of Defense, a civilian or 
military member appointed by the President and overseen by the National Assembly.202  
The military was restricted from having a role in internal security in favor of the police, 
and the military’s function was defined as “defense of national sovereignty and territory.” 
203  Furthermore, after the signing of the peace accords in 1992, legislation was developed 
to further the restructuring of the military and police forces, transferring screened members 
from the FMLN and former National Guard to the new police force with the process 
overseen by the Legislative Assembly.204     
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The former public security forces (National Guard, National Police, and Treasury 
Police) were all dissolved, and the PNC had strict rules for its new composition: only 
twenty percent of its forces could be former FMLN combatants, twenty percent could be 
former National Police, and the rest of the members were civilian.205  For the police forces, 
a new doctrine was designed and implemented, with the emphasis on crime-fighting instead 
of counterinsurgency, and required human rights training.206  Previously, the police had 
fallen under the military in the chain of command, and typically followed the military’s 
lead. Under the new civilian leadership, a new police academy was founded to train new 
police officers, including ex-combatants joining the police forces.207  Furthermore, the 
new head of the National Police was to have no ties to the former security forces and could 
not belong to any political party.208   
Despite these measures, Ellis and Berg explain how “constitutional oversight [of 
the military and law enforcement] has been largely absent resulting in a virtual abdication 
of civilian control of the military.”209  The post-war reforms were short-lived and unable 
to supersede the military’s long history of autonomy. In addition, while the peace accords 
did re-align the military under the Minister of Defense, no stipulation was set that the 
Minister of Defense be a civilian – so the idea of civilian-led military was not 
guaranteed.210  There was also no designation for legislative control of military budgets or 
executive oversight of senior military officer promotions.211  While the Salvadoran 
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military’s role in domestic affairs was restructured, little was done to explicitly adjust 
military prerogatives and to confirm a fully civilian-led military.  
El Salvador’s Intelligence Service, which had a longstanding reputation as “a feared 
instrument of military power,” was moved from military oversight to be directly under 
Presidential authority with National Assembly oversight.212  The main national 
intelligence apparatus in El Salvador, the Direccion Nacional Civil (DNI) analyzes both 
foreign and domestic intelligence, and consists of several smaller, specialized units.213  
Military intelligence and police intelligence components also work within their respective 
organizations to aid in national security, and the Ministry of Defense facilitates information 
sharing between the various intelligence agencies.214  
The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was created as 
an oversight measure for the reform process, ensuring the military, judicial, and police 
reforms were carried out as planned.215  Overall, the U.N.’s role was critical in the peace-
building process as it helped mediate crises during the reform process, helped sectors of 
the government adhere to the peace accords, and assisted with institution-building.216  
Many Salvadoran citizens had lost confidence in the judicial system in the country after 
the years of conflict and human rights violations, and needed this external oversight to 
rebuild their trust in the country’s institutions.217  However, the UN and other external 
nations’ involvement in overseeing the security sector reform ultimately contributed to a 
longer-term demise of the peace and reform process: they “did little to build Salvadoran 
capacity to promote, implement, or monitor reforms, and contributed to a lack of 
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Salvadoran ‘ownership’ of the process.”218  Under the UN, a large part of that security 
sector reform process within the peace agreement centered around the human rights 
violations that had occurred during the war, with required human rights training for the 
new branches and vetting for commanders. This was further seen in the Truth Commission, 
instituted to investigate human rights abuses that occurred during the conflict: it was 
constituted entirely of international members.219  While the Truth Commission was able 
to provide higher impartiality as a result of its international makeup, it was not a “national 
process” that involved Salvadoran society.220  Perhaps as a direct consequence, the Truth 
Commission and its successor, the Joint Group for the Investigation of Illegal Armed 
Groups, did little to stop the emergence of criminal groups, some of which grew out of the 
death squads of the civil war.221 
The Truth Commission did make several recommendations throughout the reform 
process: investigations of the death squads, new criminal justice system legislation, the 
resignation of Supreme Court justices, and new measures to ensure the protection of human 
rights.222  However, according to Johnstone, many of their recommendations were delayed 
or ignored: the Supreme Court denounced the recommendations, and the president at the 
time, President Cristiani, called for an amnesty for war crimes. Other recommendations 
were stalled by the legislative process as they required constitutional amendments.223   
Furthermore, ONUSAL’s ability to verify implementation of different aspects of 
the Peace Accords was controversial. Many questioned if the military made adequate force 
reductions as required by the accords, and FMLN weapons caches were found in the years 
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following the peace agreements, despite ONUSAL verifying FMLN’s demobilization and 
appropriate disarmament.224  There was also a lack of synchronization between 
ONUSAL’s Human Rights Division and the ONUSAL division overseeing police reform, 
resulting in an inability to properly investigate human rights abuses from the police and 
military, and further eroding public trust in parts of El Salvador’s reshaped security 
sector.225 
Due partially to these reforms, El Salvador’s restructured police force proved 
incapable of handling the waves of crime that plagued the country after the civil war: little 
was done to limit the flow of weapons, no targeted crime prevention measures were 
implemented, and long-term education and occupational plans for prior combatants and 
criminals were poorly implemented.226  One of the main reasons for this increased crime 
was an unsuccessful reintegration strategy for ex-combatants; many of the demobilized 
military and guerrilla forces were left unemployed and without a new, adjusted place in 
society.227  Many feared the demobilized police, soldiers, and guerrillas would use their 
wartime training and weapons to transition into a new role as criminal actors; this 
ultimately was the case in certain parts of the country.228  El Salvador’s murder rate tripled 
in the years immediately following the peace accords: homicides increased from just over 
3,200 annually in 1992 to over 9,000 annually in 1994.229  Consequently, the military, 
recently removed from the domestic crime-fighting process, was brought back in to help 
with the provision of public security on what was planned to be a temporary basis in the 
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mid-1990s.230  Their role was sustained into the twenty-first century as Salvadoran 
political leaders took a hardline approach to crime and implemented mano dura (iron fist) 
policies – often leading to high levels of violence.231  The military was unsuccessful at 
lowering crime rates, but public perception of the military and its involvement in 
crimefighting was positive despite continued human rights violations.232  While El 
Salvador’s plan for post-conflict security sector reform initially delineated roles for the 
military and police and established human rights training and vetting processes for security 
officers, the forces’ roles ultimately became muddled as domestic crime rates climbed in 
the years following the civil conflict. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The peace accords and reform process were successful in the conversion of the 
FMLN into a political party and the corresponding electoral reform processes, making way 
for a two-party system (consisting of FMLN and the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista, or 
ARENA), with some other smaller parties emerging sporadically.233  While the overall 
reform was unsuccessful at fully reincorporating ex-combatants into society, they were at 
least able to maintain the FMLN’s role in politics, a long-standing request by the group 
throughout the conflict and peace process.  
Nevertheless, a major issue still facing the security sector today in El Salvador is 
organized crime. While the peace agreements separated the roles of the military and police, 
recent administrations allowed the military to maintain a role in public security, resulting 
in reduced oversight of human rights abuses in favor of fighting crime.234  Overall, El 
Salvador’s approach to combatting crime since the civil conflict has been to focus on a 
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hard-line approach to finding and arresting criminals, and the security sector has failed to 
look for long-term solutions, including anti-crime education and training or finding ways 
to re-integrate reformed criminals (or prior combatants that may have turned to crime) into 
society.235  Similarly, with the military consistently stepping in to cover the police force’s 
deficiencies, the government has failed to invest in more effective law enforcement training 
or strategy development for its civil police force.236     
Outside of police and military reform and institution-building, El Salvador’s 
government was slow to invest in many public and social institutions after the conflict. The 
public health system underwent post-conflict reforms, but progress has been slow and poor 
quality of services resulted in many workers strikes, especially in rural areas.237  The 
government is still working to improve education programs to boost literacy rates, as well 
as to develop juvenile delinquency programs to address the catastrophic crime levels, both 
of which are longer-term ventures without immediate results.238 
In addition, El Salvador failed to undertake local ownership when planning and 
executing security sector reform, to ensure the domestic government sustains the plan and 
efforts put in place by any external monitors.239  El Salvador’s post-conflict reform process 
was, hence, largely run by external actors, especially the U.N., which made local takeover 
of the efforts difficult and likely contributed to some of the failures in the reform process. 
Furthermore, El Salvador failed to prioritize and enforce the disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration of ex-combatants, which in turn resulted in many ex-combatants 
becoming involved with crime. As crime rates rose in the country, the military and police’s 
divided roles were once again made murky in favor of greater crime-fighting capabilities, 
and the initial attention given to correcting the war’s human rights abuses was pushed aside. 
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These short-term solutions to fighting crime were insufficient, and El Salvador still requires 
long-term institutions, education, and training to eradicate crime that has grown in post-
conflict years. 
53 
IV. CASE STUDY: SRI LANKA 
This chapter examines another case study where a country attempted to reform its 
security sector after civil conflict. Sri Lanka is faced with the challenge of reintegrating ex-
combatants from a minority ethnic group back into society, and ensuring proper 
disarmament, demobilization, and security for them as they return to their homes. 
Furthermore, combatants on both sides committed egregious human rights violations on 
the civilian population throughout the duration of the conflict. Proper training and vetting 
of their police, military, and intelligence forces to prevent future violations is critical for 
the security sector to rebuild the trust of the general population and ensure long-term 
stability in Sri Lanka. Analyzing the case of Sri Lanka provides additional insight because 
the process has stalled, due partially to a lack of external oversight keeping the Sri Lankan 
government accountable of enacting the promised reforms.    
A. BACKGROUND ON THE CONFLICT 
Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict between the Tamils, a minority ethnic group that turned 
to insurgency, and the majority Sinhalese government lasted for over twenty-five years. It 
resulted in over seventy-five thousand deaths and a million displaced persons, until the 
government ultimately claimed victory in 2009. The violence began in the 1970s, when 
Tamils revolted after years of discrimination, including policies reducing their acceptance 
to universities, state-sponsored colonization of Tamil areas by Sinhalese peasants, and the 
banning of importation of Tamil-language media.240  Furthermore, the 1979 Prevention of 
Terrorism Act gave the Sri Lankan government the right to arrest and imprison anyone 
“suspected of unlawful activity,” leading to many human rights abuses against Tamils as 
the conflict waged on.241  Tamil youth formed and mobilized militant groups, the most 
prominent of which came to be known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 
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founded in 1976, with the ultimate goal of establishing their own state, Eelam, in the 
northern part of the country.242   
Beginning in the late 1970s, the LTTE carried out assassinations against opposing 
political figures, and eventually transitioned to ambushes against military patrols and 
suicide bombing attacks by the early 1980s. Throughout the conflict, both the LTTE and 
the government reportedly attacked civilians in several massacres and counter-massacres 
in areas between their respective operational zones.243   
The Indian government, specifically its intelligence service (Research and Analysis 
Wing, or RAW), initially provided military aid and financial support to the LTTE, fueling 
the group’s rise.244  However, as the violence escalated, India withdrew support and in 
1987 pressured the Sri Lankan government to “concede a degree of political devolution to 
Tamil areas, and agreeing to the entry of Indian forces as guarantors of peace in the 
contested areas.”245  The guarantee was short-lived, and the conflict continued, with the 
Indian peacekeeping force departing by 1990 as the LTTE turned increasingly to acts of 
terrorism.246   
B. THE PEACE PROCESS AND EARLY SECURITY SECTOR REFORM 
Initial cease-fire agreements brokered by Norway were signed in 2002, but only 
lasted a few years before fighting restarted, catalyzed by the assassination of Sri Lanka’s 
foreign minister.247  Once again, civilians were caught in the cross-fire: Tamil forces 
allegedly refused to allow civilians to leave areas where the LTTE was fighting the 
government, and the government indiscriminately shelled those civilian-inhabited 
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areas.248  Hundreds of thousands of civilians were displaced and many were killed by 
members of both sides of the conflict; both the government and LTTE have been accused 
of violating international laws of war.249  While another peace agreement was not signed 
after the failed truces of 2002, the Sri Lankan government claimed to have effectively 
destroyed the LTTE’s “conventional military capabilities” in May 2009, declaring an end 
to the conflict after a three-week campaign that also led to the death of the LTTE leader, 
Vellupillai Prabhakaran.250  
With over twenty thousand civilians reportedly killed in the final three-week 
government campaign against the LTTE and hundreds of thousands more living in refugee 
camps, leaders from the United Nations visited Sri Lanka in late May 2009.251  The U.N. 
sought to assess the country’s humanitarian status and to urge Sri Lankan leadership to 
address both sides’ grievances in order to develop a lasting solution for peace. In the report 
filed after their visit, the U.N. outlined concerns about the unknown numbers of LTTE 
soldiers and weapons remaining in Sri Lanka, fearing a quick restart to the fighting.252  
The report also detailed concerns about LTTE members living abroad that may return to 
Sri Lanka to reinvigorate the conflict, especially if some of the group’s post-conflict needs 
and demands are not met.253 
Overall, the largest issues to address for post-conflict reconstruction in Sri Lanka 
were the reintegration and protection of former combatants and LTTE supporters, the 
security and trust of the minority Tamil population (just under one fifth of Sri Lanka’s total 
population), the accountability for human rights violations committed by each side in the 
conflict, and the sustained protection of displaced persons as a result of the conflict.254  
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Despite these challenging tasks, the Sri Lankan government declined U.N. assistance 
immediately following the conflict’s resolution in 2009, instead choosing to address the 
reconstruction efforts domestically.255 
Throughout the conflict, the Sinhala-dominated security forces were seen as 
oppressive, and typically received minimal training before being transferred to serve in 
Tamil areas.256  Many members of the security forces were not educated on the Tamil 
grievances that had caused the conflict. Furthermore, they “had no experience of 
responding to conflict under normal [non-Emergency Regulation] conditions,” which 
afforded them significant autonomy in their operations and may have led to increased 
violence against the civilian population.257  These alleged human rights violations against 
the larger Tamil civilian population in the areas of conflict needed to be addressed as a part 
of the larger reform process, and also displayed the need for increased training for future 
security forces so they were able to operate under peacetime conditions, without the 
provisions permitted by the conflict’s Emergency Regulations. 
In order for effective security sector reform to occur in Sri Lanka, oversight 
mechanisms are required across the government and the security sector. While the Sri 
Lankan constitution includes parliamentary oversight for the security sector,  “the degree 
to which parliamentary mechanisms are used to oversee the security sector is marginal.”258  
Bastian also explains how the security forces of Sri Lanka are rarely scrutinized, even when 
making budgetary determinations or other parliamentary decisions for their operation – 
they are able to operate with minimal oversight. In addition, the judiciary branch required 
overhaul as the military had previously been able to overrule its decisions, so changes were 
necessary to re-assert judiciary authority to ensure a balance of power across the branches 
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of government.259  Legal provisions such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act and 
Emergency Regulations and the Indemnity Act had permitted the executive branch to 
enforce laws without parliamentary approval and limited freedom of the press during the 
conflict, allegedly allowing for unjustified detentions, human rights violations, and a lack 
of overall oversight for the security sector.260  These acts also provided immunity to 
members of the security sector, lowering public trust of the police and military. With the 
resolution of the conflict, changes were needed across the security sector and branches of 
government to ensure accountability and oversight. 
After the signing of the 2002 peace agreements, the Prime Minister directed a 
review of the Sri Lankan military by a Defense Review Committee to examine the military 
leadership structure, overhaul government legislation regarding the armed forces, and 
review defense policy and force downsizing plans for the years following the civil war.261  
The Defense Review Committee’s main recommendation was to give the role of 
Commander-in-Chief of the military to the prime minister, which was ultimately not 
carried out as the armed forces remained under the responsibility of the president.262  As 
a number of NGOs began hosting their own SSR forums and seminars, the Defense Review 
Committee lost credibility because the media depicted the NGOs as intervening in and 
overtaking the process of national security policy.263  Consequently, the Defense Review 
Committee failed to develop and implement its own long-term national security plan for 
Sri Lanka. Once the conflict resumed, the military was expanded by over 40,000 new 
members, creating an even larger force to contend with during the eventual security sector 
reform after the fighting ceased in 2009.264   
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In addition to the creation of the Defense Review Committee, the Sri Lankan 
government sought to address the human rights violations occurring during the civil 
conflict. In 2000, the Directorate of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, which 
coordinated all human rights activities of the Sri Lankan army, was established.265  
Military members were required to attend human rights training and adhere to rules of 
engagement meant to reduce civilian casualties, but violations continued as the conflict 
waged on in favor of a quicker Sinhala victory.266  The police followed suit in 2002 with 
the creation of the Police Human Rights Division, which worked with international human 
rights organizations and sought to enhance training and human rights knowledge for the 
police forces to decrease future human rights violations.267  In addition, the National Police 
Commission was established in the same year to assume control of selection, promotion, 
transfer, and removal of police officers and to “investigate public complaints of any 
aggrieved person made against a Police Officer or the Police Service.”268  Again, the 
Commission proved to be effective in name only as it often failed to carry out the promised 
investigations or disciplinary inquiries; another unsuccessful reform in Sri Lanka’s final 
decade of conflict.269  
C. AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE: FURTHER SECURITY SECTOR REFORM 
EFFORTS 
After the 2009 cease-fire, the Sri Lankan military was largely responsible for 
reintegrating ex-combatants and helping displaced civilians return home. Sri Lankan 
military leaders were appointed to develop a rehabilitation program for ex-combatants, 
including vocational training. As part of the reintegration process, Sri Lanka’s military 
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increased its presence in the Tamil-dominated northern parts of the country, using security 
provision to justify their footprint but angering many of the Tamils in the area.270    
The election of Maithripala Sirisena in 2015 to the presidency paved the way for 
further reform efforts after several years of stagnation throughout the 2000s. Sirisena 
received support from ethnic groups across the country, including both Tamils and 
Sinhalese, after accusations of corruption were made against his predecessor.271  As part 
of his campaign, Sirisena promised to carry out a number of political reforms and to 
investigate war crimes committed during the civil conflict.  
President Sirisena began his tenure by working to release Tamil prisoners and 
requiring rehabilitation for the former prisoners before they were sent back to their 
homes.272  However, many of the former detainees reportedly faced harassment from 
police and military leaders, and an improved process is still required to better re-integrate 
the Tamil prisoners back into society. The government is also taking measures to provide 
relief and justice to the families of twenty thousand disappeared Tamils, providing “interim 
relief” and “certificates of absence” to give legal rights to the families of the 
disappeared.273  Nonetheless, investigations have failed to lead to arrests due to the 
government’s hesitation to implicate the police and military for their involvement with the 
disappeared. The International Crisis Group blames the slow pace of investigations and 
development of new policies on a lack of civilian control over the military, saying Sri 
Lanka needs “a coherent, politically savvy policy for comprehensive security sector 
reform, including the police and intelligence services. There is no sign that such a policy 
is even under development.”274   
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President Sirisena’s government, despite promises to promote the peace process 
and increase stability in the country, has allowed the military to maintain their presence in 
the Tamil-populated northern and eastern parts of the country and has yet to find a way to 
curtail abuse against Tamils returning to their homes.275  Even with the education and 
training practices implemented for the security sector prior to the conflict’s end, the 
International Crisis Group reported “little knowledge in the military about transitional 
justice and no sustained attempt by senior civilians to win its support for institutional 
reform and accountability;” many reform efforts have failed to come to fruition.276  
Moreover, seeking to maintain political support from the military, the government and 
Sirisena have focused on reassuring the military of non-prosecution for actions during the 
war and have not emphasized human rights training for remaining military members.277   
Constitutional reforms in Sri Lanka have also stalled: there was significant 
disagreement on how to best unite the ethnic groups while allowing a degree of self-rule to 
the Tamils in the north and east. However, after the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights’ (OHCHR) investigation in 2015 found a “horrific level 
of violations and abuses,” the Commissioner called for “a hybrid special court, integrating 
international judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and investigators,” as well as multiple legal and 
institutional reforms.278  This reform process included the necessary legal changes to 
prosecute for crimes against humanity as well as a constitutional measure for the conflict’s 
political settlement, finally ending impunity for the military and police’s war crimes during 
the conflict.279  This resolution showed tremendous promise, and OHCHR experts visited 
Sri Lanka throughout 2016 to assist in developing plans for its implementation.280  In spite 
of this involvement, the International Crisis Group noted the Sri Lankan government’s lack 
of resources and backing for implementation of the process, doubting its ability to carry 
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out the required reforms due to continued Sinhala nationalism and pro-military 
sentiment.281 
U.N. committees made their recommendations for a plan to handle the security 
sector’s human rights violation record during the conflict, but were met with resistance 
from the Sri Lankan government. The U.N. Committee Against Torture wrote of the Sri 
Lankan security sector’s lack of accountability and continued use of torture, and advocated 
for the repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act.282  However, the U.N.’s 
recommendations were not implemented and the security sector was able to continue 
activities without undergoing further legal investigations.  
Cave and Manoharan highlight the importance of Sri Lankan media in the country’s 
post-conflict reconstruction and reform process, explaining how it can keep the public 
updated and serve as a feedback mechanism as the security sector reform process 
continues. “The media’s capacity in providing accurate, reliable and timely information on 
reforms that are underway is crucial in highlighting the seriousness of the reforms process 
and spotting the inadequacies,” and “facilitates the checks and balances on the three 
[branches] of government:” a valuable tool for the process.283  However, despite it playing 
a critical role in Sri Lanka’s security sector reform process, the country’s media has faced 
some restrictions: Tamil newspapers that highlighted abuses by the security forces were 
shut down or censored and over a dozen journalists were killed for speaking out against 
the government and its policies during the conflict between 2006 and 2009.284  In other 
cases, the media has been used as propaganda, with each side of the former conflict using 
their own media outlets to justify their position and voice concerns.285  However, the media 
continues to be a way to inform the public about security sector reform processes and serves 
as a feedback mechanism to ensure reform efforts are properly carried out.  
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NGOs also helped with the reform process in Sri Lanka as the violence concluded, 
furthering the public’s awareness of the country’s progress and advocating for civil rights 
when the state violates them. Approximately four thousand NGOs are present in Sri Lanka, 
and have been involved in a range of roles throughout the security sector reform: providing 
legal assistance to human rights victims, advocating against certain laws, establishing 
seminars to educate the citizens about their rights, and publishing documents on human 
rights laws.286  While the NGOs are capable of providing benefits for Sri Lankan citizens 
in the wake of the civil conflict, the Sri Lankan government has elected to monitor their 
funding and activities, occasionally shutting down some of the human rights protective 
activities the NGOs were previously performing.287   
D. ONGOING CHALLENGES TO THE REFORM PROCESS 
Sri Lanka’s government has struggled to enact the promised reforms since the 
cease-fire. One issue lies in the judicial sector, which has a reputation of being weak and 
easily influenced by political pressure.288  The courts lack the resources to conduct the 
investigations and trials for the substantial human rights abuses, and many of the judges 
(especially in higher courts) do not speak Tamil.289  In addition, political interference and 
a lack of power has restricted the judicial branch in Sri Lanka from “checking the repressive 
character of the security sector:” there are few trials of security sector officials to hold them 
accountable for their actions during the conflict.290  This perceived weakness of the 
judiciary, combined with the impunity afforded to security sector officials by the conflict’s 
Emergency Regulations, has not allowed it to check the power of the security sector and 
influence the reform process. With the Prevention of Terrorism Act still in place almost a 
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decade after the conflict’s end, the security sector’s impunity is arguably high and 
accountability is low.291 
Sri Lanka’s executive branch has held the ultimate authority in the country, despite 
Parliament’s supposed abilities to limit the executive’s powers.292  The president often 
makes unilateral decisions, including appointments to commissions, the civil service, 
judicial bodies, and human rights services; allocation of the defense budget; and 
declarations of states of emergency.293  The legislative branch has little involvement in 
defense planning and policy, and many members of Parliament lack knowledge on matters 
related to defense.  
Adding to the human rights violations and overall turmoil caused throughout the 
Sri Lankan conflict were the armed non-state groups – typically non-LTTE Tamil and 
Muslim groups the state sponsored as hit squads.294  According to Cave and Manoharan, 
these groups were used to seize and hold territory and directly supported the Sinhala 
government’s efforts. As of 2009, there were no efforts made by the government to 
incorporate these groups into the security sector reform process, and several of the groups 
still operate in certain parts of the country, making accountability and post-conflict 
reintegration a challenge.295 
E. CONCLUSION 
Sri Lanka’s security sector reform process is ongoing due to a consistent failure to 
implement the transitional justice mechanisms and to hold security forces accountable for 
human rights violations throughout the conflict. While the security sector of Sri Lanka is 
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still needed in the country to support internal peacekeeping and stability, a framework is 
lacking to define their required strength, force distribution, and to outline their mission set 
now that the violence has concluded.296  The continued existence of the Prevention of 
Terror Act also inhibits the reform process due to the unchecked power it gives the armed 
forces, no longer justified with the resolution of the conflict. The Sri Lankan military’s 
sustained presence in the north, despite promises by President Sirisena to return the land to 
Tamils, has affected the region’s economy and culture, resulting in protests and unrest from 
its majority-Tamil inhabitants.297 
The government’s shortcomings in the reform process may be due to a lack of 
organization and a clear command structure: much of the reform “task force” is made up 
of foreign ministry officials who also have other roles in government and no consistent 
international members have been brought in to advise long-term.298  Due to the lack of 
progress and lack of accountability for human rights violators, many Sri Lankans have 
begun to doubt the abilities of the government to enact successful reforms and foster 
stability in the country. To ensure the success of the ongoing reform process, the 
government needs to regain the trust of the population and educate them on the critical 
reform measures and how those measures will be executed. The International Crisis Group 
recommends a strategy to establish civilian control over the military and a demilitarization 
of the Tamil-dominated north and east in order to permit the justice mechanisms to take 
hold while the security sector undergoes “longer-term democratic transformation.”299  
Efforts to rewrite the Sri Lankan Constitution have been underway since 2016, with 
the stated goal of increasing provincial power.300  However, progress with the Constitution 
has also stalled, which some blame on a lack of external pressure and oversight.301  Since 
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the reform process has begun, only the U.N. has provided limited oversight, but its inability 
to enforce policy recommendations has resulted in many ideas with very little 
implementation in the years since the conflict’s end. Sri Lanka’s lack of modified 
legislature to move the reform process forward has proven to be yet another roadblock for 
the country and its ethnic divisions. 
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V. CONCLUSION: ANALYSIS, FINDINGS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis sought to identify possible a security sector reform model for post-
conflict Colombia. Toward this end, it  provided an overview of the conflict in Colombia 
as well as the current state of the security sector following the signing of peace accords. It 
also explored two case studies of countries (El Salvador and Sri Lanka) that attempted 
security sector reform after periods of civil conflict to identify what aspects of their reform 
plans were successful. This chapter provides a comparative analysis of the case studies, 
tests the hypothesis of the importance of domestic ownership balanced with external 
oversight on security sector reform in Colombia, examines the hypothesis of reintegrating 
former combatants into the security sector, and provides recommendations for a model for 
Colombia’s security sector. 
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The three countries analyzed strived to reintegrate ex-combatants into military and 
civilian life while also undergoing a significant reshaping of their security sectors. Each 
country needed to shift the security sector’s focus from civil war and counterinsurgency to 
maintaining stability, protecting human rights, and fighting domestic crime. Comparing the 
successes and failures in these countries’ reforms may help develop a long-term model for 
Colombia. When examining the case studies, a comparative analysis was conducted on: 
the degree of external involvement versus local ownership of the security sector reform 
process, the level and effectiveness of oversight in the reform process, the reintegration of 
ex-combatants, and the process of force reduction and human rights training for the security 
sector.  
1. External Involvement vs. Local Ownership 
The three case studies reveal variances in the extent to which they allowed external 
involvement in their security sector reform processes. For example, external involvement 
was very prevalent in El Salvador’s security sector reform process. The United Nations 
was the primary actor, with the creation of the United Nations Observer Mission in El 
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Salvador (ONUSAL) to oversee reconstruction, ensure the peace accords were adhered to, 
and to assist with the building of institutions.302  The U.N. also investigated human rights 
abuses perpetrated by both sides during the conflict through the Truth Commission, an 
international (and theoretically impartial) organization designed to aid the reform 
process.303  El Salvador’s security sector reform was successful in the short-term with the 
addition of civilian leadership over the police, military, and intelligence and with the 
human rights abuses investigations facilitated by the United Nations. However, in the 
longer term many of these advances were abandoned due to a lack of local ownership of 
the reform process. Initiatives of the United Nations that could not be or were not properly 
enforced remained incomplete and Salvadorans were unable to take over implementing 
many of the reforms  ONUSAL had begun. While the U.N. assisted in mediating crises 
during the initial post-conflict reconstruction process and provided oversight of police, 
military, and intelligence reforms, it ultimately did little to build Salvadorans’ own abilities 
to implement and monitor the reforms.304  Consequently, Salvadorans were not invested 
in ensuring the Truth Commission and its successors carried out the investigations and 
training they had been designed to implement, making the prescribed measures 
unsustainable. A lack of synchronization across the branches of Salvadoran government 
and within ONUSAL led to difficulties ensuring the force reductions and weapons seizures 
outlined in the peace accords were carried out, proving detrimental to El Salvador’s long-
term security. 
Unlike El Salvador, Sri Lanka turned away U.N. assistance in 2009 when the 
conflict ended, planning to address and solve the conflict without external involvement.305  
Sri Lanka’s decision to limit external involvement in the reform process contributed to 
certain still-unresolved aspects of reform. The government did not designate a clear 
command control leadership structure for the reform task force, and the leaders chosen to 
lead the charge were ill-trained and without sufficient time and resources to fully dedicate 
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to security sector reform. A lack of external oversight over the still majority-Sinhala 
government did little to foster trust among the general population in the post-conflict 
reconstruction process, and also resulted in slow progress to enact the promised reforms. 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) played a limited role in the early reconstruction 
process, providing legal assistance and education to citizens that had been victims of 
human rights violations. However, the Sri Lankan government imposed restrictions to their 
funding and activities, limiting the role the NGOs could play in the overall reform 
process.306 
By contrast, Colombia has thus far developed and executed its own post-conflict 
agenda for reconstruction and reform. The establishment of the National Commission on 
Reparation and Reconciliation, a locally-managed commission with members from the 
government and civil society that provides human rights protections and reparations to 
victims of the civil conflict demonstrates Colombia’s desire for local ownership of the 
reform and reconstruction. While the United States provided significant funding and 
military aid to Colombia throughout the conflict, Colombia has yet to solicit additional 
U.S. involvement in the reform process since the 2016 peace accords.307 
2. Oversight 
All three countries struggled to develop and implement oversight mechanisms 
across the branches of government as part of their security sector reform processes. With 
regard to executive control and oversight in Colombia and Sri Lanka, there is a lack of 
civilian knowledge across the defense ministries on matters of national security and 
defense planning, which has spurred further military autonomy despite attempts to bring 
the militaries under civilian control.308  In El Salvador, there is little legislative oversight 
of security sector operations, nor is the Minister of Defense consistently a civilian-held 
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position.309  Furthermore, all three countries lack parliamentary control over security 
sector budgets, promotions, and activities, so little can be done to check the prerogatives 
of the military, police, and intelligence forces. In El Salvador, ONUSAL was responsible 
for providing oversight of the security sector reform process as government institutions 
were rebuilt. However, many of their recommendations were ignored and oversight of the 
executive branch left with them.310  Similarly, Sri Lanka’s constitutional oversight 
mechanisms that grant the legislative and judicial branches a way to check the executive’s 
power are rarely used: the armed forces have typically overruled the judicial system and 
made their own operational decisions without parliamentary approval.311   
A helpful external oversight mechanism—in particular for Sri Lankan reform—has 
been the media, which was able to update the public on the reforms as they occurred and 
could also help highlight inadequacies. While some restrictions and censoring of the media 
in all three countries hindered the ability to provide robust feedback, it has still been a 
valuable tool for the public as reforms are attempted.  
All in all, oversight across the branches of government has not been integrated into 
the security sector reform processes of any of the three countries, partially due to a lack of 
knowledge on security forces’ policies and planning on the part of the civilians in each 
country’s defense ministries. External oversight by the media has provided some relief for 
that problem, but has not been sufficient to balance the power and autonomy held by the 
security sectors in these countries.  
3. Reintegration of Combatants 
Both El Salvador and Sri Lanka have failed to fully execute their reintegration plans 
for former combatants, while Colombia is still working to ensure former FARC members 
do not amass in rural areas to mount another insurgency. El Salvador was able to politically 
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integrate former insurgents: the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), 
became a left-wing political party after the signing of the 1992 peace accords, eventually 
winning over a third of Legislative Assembly seats by the 2000 elections.312  This trend 
continued in the following years, despite some fractures within the FMLN political party 
as time went on. However, where El Salvador’s newly redesigned security sector failed 
was in allowing for the growth of criminal groups due to a failure to properly reintegrate 
former combatants.  
The lack of targeted crime prevention measures after the conflict, no long-term 
educational or occupational plans for ex-combatants, and insufficient oversight of the 
combatant disarmament process led to a dramatic increase in crime in El Salvador.313  This 
in turn resulted in the abandonment of many of the long-term plans for police and military 
reform in favor of a knee-jerk response of fighting crime, and human rights violations 
returned as security forces worked to find and arrest criminals as quickly as possible.  
Similarly, Sri Lanka began making headway with new efforts to release and 
rehabilitate Tamil prisoners with the election of President Sirisena in 2015, with promises 
to provide legal rights to families of the disappeared and the development of a plan for 
investigating said disappearances.314  However, despite these reforms, all have been slow 
in their implementation and alternate plans for Tamil ex-combatants are still required for 
their protection and reintegration. Furthermore, the Sinhala-dominated military’s sustained 
presence in the largely Tamil-inhabited north and northeast of the country, despite the 
conflict ending over ten years ago, has led to protests from the Tamils who were promised 
land when they returned home.315 
Colombia’s faces a similar reintegration challenge as it balances the safe return and 
rehabilitation training of combatants with a reduction in military forces in former conflict 
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zones. Colombia already faces a growing problem from criminal groups that have arisen 
from former paramilitary members that fought in the civil conflict, a less serious version 
of what El Salvador experienced when it failed to reintegrate ex-combatants. All in all, 
developing a plan for the safe return of combatants to their villages, as well as providing 
plans for their employment – either as civilians or members of the security sector – is 
critical for avoiding surges of crime and further unrest. 
4. Force Reduction and Human Rights Training 
The three case studies reveal the difficulty in realigning the security sector with 
new mission sets after conflict and incorporating a new oversight and leadership structure. 
Each country made efforts to define the new missions for their police, military, and 
intelligence forces and attempted to emphasize human rights protections. For example, El 
Salvador reduced the size and strength of its military, introduced more oversight measures, 
and modified the military’s role to focus on “defense of national sovereignty and 
territory.”316  A newly reorganized civil police force, which included former FMLN 
combatants and members of the pre-conflict security forces, was given the role of providing 
internal security and fighting crime. The intelligence sector was also redesigned to fall 
under the president instead of the military, installing civilian leadership and oversight.317  
Colombia also introduced new policies to more clearly delineate and restrict the roles of 
its police, military, and intelligence sectors, and has included human rights training across 
the security sector’s initial mission policies.318  However, according to Albrecht Schnabel 
and Hans Born, Colombia has focused its efforts on “modernizing security sector 
institutions instead of making them more accountable,” which could undermine the 
security sector’s long-term success.319 
                                                 
316 Wolf, “Policing Crime in El Salvador,” 44. 
317 Negroponte, Seeking Peace in El Salvador, 129. 
318 Locarno, “The Colombian Army in the 21st Century.” 
319 Albrecht Schnabel and Hans Born, Security Sector Reform: Narrowing the Gap Between Theory 
and Practice, (London: Ubiquity Press, 2011): 25. 
73 
Sri Lanka’s attempt to focus on human rights and re-structure the mission sets of 
its security forces was initially promising with the introduction of the Directorate of Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law in late 2000, which assisted with human rights training for 
police forces as the conflict continued.320  These efforts did help to initially boost civilian 
trust in the security sector, but human rights violations and civilian casualties continued as 
the conflict waged on. Thus, the laws and training were seen as ineffective in the long-term 
to many Sri Lankan civilians. The Sri Lankan military has a history of being politicized, 
and high-ranking politicians have been hesitant to hold military members accountable for 
any war crimes. To sum up, El Salvador was significantly more successful than Sri Lanka 
and Colombia in carrying out armed forces reforms to reorganize its security sector’s force 
distribution and missions set.   
B. HYPOTHESIS TESTING AND FINDINGS 
Overall, literature pointed to the importance of local ownership for successful 
security sector reform, with many scholars agreeing that the local population must be 
engaged in the planning process, simultaneously re-building their relationship with and 
increasing trust in the government.321  In line with this argument, there is also a consensus 
among a number of scholars that reform programs need to be culturally relevant, and cannot 
be too radical of a departure from how citizens typically view their leadership structure.322  
Especially in cases like Colombia, where the country has been affected by decades of 
conflict, scholars also outline the need for a long-term, sustainable strategy for security 
sector reconstruction; results may not be immediate. Where scholars differ in opinion is 
the provision of immediate post-conflict security, with some seeing this as a role for 
international peacekeeping missions to alleviate the strain on domestic security forces 
focused on internal reform.  
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I originally hypothesized Colombia’s security sector reform should follow Timothy 
Edmunds’ framework, striving for democratically accountable and transparent security 
institutions. I hypothesized that Colombia will need to emphasize domestic ownership of 
the security sector reform process, with external oversight to ensure the plan is 
implemented. I also hypothesized integration of FARC members into the security sector 
could be a long-term plan for Colombia, but would likely take years to fully implement. 
Based on the lessons learned from the case studies, my initial hypothesis of 
Colombia having a locally owned plan remains valid, with the caveat that sustained 
external oversight may be necessary to ensure the government carries out its promised 
reforms. External oversight could avoid the issues in Sri Lanka, where the government’s 
lack of oversight has resulted in very few of the promised reforms being implemented, and 
also could solve the problems El Salvador faced regarding an inability to sustain reforms 
once the external party departed the country. 
Finally, in line with my hypothesis, the implementation of ex-combatants into the 
security sector could be a long-term process but may have a number of benefits, as shown 
by the outcomes of the other case studies. Allowing former FARC members to serve in the 
Colombian military, police, and intelligence sectors could help avoid their turn to criminal 
behavior, as was the case with many ex-combatants in El Salvador that failed to re-
integrate. It may also pave the way for unity across the formerly divided country. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS TO COLOMBIAN POLICY-MAKERS, 
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND MEDIA 
In line with the findings, Colombia’s course of action could follow Timothy 
Edmunds’ four steps to security sector reform. It may be key for Colombia to strike a 
balance between local ownership of reform planning and execution and external oversight 
of the reform process to ensure the plan is carried out and power is balanced across the 
security sector and branches of government. One way to implement this may be through 
the proper execution of Timothy Edmunds’ steps to security reform success, as follows.323 
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1. Develop a clear institutional framework for providing security that 
includes all relevant actors and focuses on the vulnerable 
(i) An initial security sector reform plan should be developed by a 
panel of internal and external actors. This plan can include the 
roles and missions of the military, police, and intelligence forces 
and will outline the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
process for ex-combatants. 
(ii) The panel could have a majority of Colombian officials and a 
minority of external partners, consisting of United Nations 
members for their perceived impartiality; United States members 
for their prior involvement in Plan Colombia; and other South and 
Central American leadership members for their vested interest in 
regional and continental peace and stability. This could enable 
Colombia to develop a culturally relevant plan with domestic 
ownership throughout implementation with external nations and 
multinational organizations overseeing adherence to the plan and 
its prescribed timeline. Panel members could also serve as an 
oversight mechanism through continued feedback, meetings, and 
observances of the plan’s implementation and progress. 
(iii)A peacekeeping force stationed in Colombia could augment 
Colombian security forces to provide short-term, immediate 
security for the people of Colombia as security sector reform and 
post-conflict reconstruction begin. This peacekeeping force could 
consist of international members, as designated by the United 
Nations. 
• This security force could provide for the safety of ex-
combatants returning to their former (or new) communities and 
may also help provide stability in areas destroyed or disrupted 
by the civil conflict.  
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• External augmentation could allow Colombian security forces 
to immediately dedicate time and resources to human rights 
training and mission training for their post-conflict new roles.  
• The general population’s eroded trust for Colombian security 
forces could be slowly rebuilt as external peacekeeping forces 
initially maintained security and ensured the protection of 
human rights.  
(iv) The DDR aspect of the plan for former FARC and paramilitary 
members may need to incentivize weapons turn-in to the 
government to better guarantee compliance by ex-combatants. This 
process, run by the security sector, should also include a degree of 
external oversight to ensure the safety of ex-combatants. 
• The National Police already has a plan to include former FARC 
members in its ranks, and there will need to be monitoring by 
members of the security sector and external organizations to 
ensure ex-combatants are protected for the first several years 
following their return to society, and that they are not 
discriminated against when applying for jobs or training 
opportunities.  
• Effective DDR could reduce the risk of crime and the 
expansion of criminal groups (Bandas Criminales or 
BACRIM) in Colombia if ex-combatants have training and 
professional opportunities. 
2. Strengthen governance and oversight of security institutions 
(i) While external oversight to ensure Colombia’s security sector 
reform runs smoothly may aid in the short-term, a system of 
checks and balances within the government and security sector 
should be established and upheld for sustained program success.  
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• The intelligence sector, under civilian rule due to its 
position under the President, has already established an 
intelligence board to fuse intelligence sources and ensure 
communication across the different agencies and 
directorates.  
• Inspector generals and a Congressional Oversight 
Committee monitor intelligence activities but can build 
their effectiveness through increased intelligence training 
so they are more aware of current operations. 
• Increased intelligence training across the legislative branch 
can build civilian knowledge and interest, encouraging 
increased communication and feedback between legislators 
and intelligence professionals. 
• With the police and military both falling under the Ministry 
of Defense, civilian oversight could be guaranteed by only 
allowing civilians to hold the top position of Minister of 
Defense.  
(ii) Colombia should promote freedom of the press; the media can 
serve as an additional feedback mechanism and external oversight 
as the reform process occurs. 
3. Build capable, professional, and accountable security forces open to 
dialogue with civil society organizations 
(i) The police, military, and intelligence forces of Colombia should 
dedicate a significant portion of their manpower and resources to 
internal training focused on their new post-conflict mission set, 
with an emphasis on human rights protections. 
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(ii) After their allotted time in country, the external peacekeepers 
could be phased out in favor of the re-trained Colombian security 
sector who could assume the role of ensuring domestic stability 
and security.  
(iii)Within the Ministry of Defense, civilians overseeing the police and 
military can receive increased strategy and planning training so 
they are aware of each department’s new roles and missions. This 
training should increase civilians’ abilities to advise military and 
police leadership on government plans, policies, and procedures. 
(iv) External oversight from the SSR panel can help ensure the security 
sector is adhering to its new mission focused on the provision of 
domestic security and human rights protections. 
4. Promote the sustainable delivery of justice and security324 
(i) The Colombian government can work to develop a long-term plan 
for dedicating resources and specialized training for the police 
forces to suppress any remaining pockets of FARC members or 
BACRIM groups and to help prevent the growth of domestic 
crime.  
(ii) With the military focused on external security, this can largely be a 
responsibility of the National Police, although specialized military 
units could be designated for supplemental support.  
(iii)An emphasis on urban environment operations should occur in 
training for the National Police.  
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(iv) Simultaneously, the government should establish a long-term plan 
for improving rural infrastructure and addressing the grievances of 
former FARC members and civilians in those areas. 
(v) The  FARC has long hoped to establish itself as a political party in 
Colombia, and officially did so after the peace agreements were 
signed as the Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común, or 
Common Alternative Revolutionary Force (still abbreviated in 
Colombia as FARC).325  It can now represent the needs and policy 
goals of former combatants and supporters in a legal setting, which 
should discourage future armed combat as a way of making its 
needs known.   
D. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis used existing theoretical framework and empirical research on how 
various countries have restructured their security sectors after internal conflict in order to 
develop a model for Colombia’s post-conflict security sector. Further research can be done 
on the long-term effects of Colombia’s SSR decisions in the years following the signing of 
the peace accords to see what measures have proven successful in maintaining democratic 
oversight of the security sector as well as national stability. In addition, the Colombian 
DDR process can be more closely examined to examine the ideal reintegration program for 
ex-combatants on both sides of the civil conflict. Seeing what type of education and 
training best helps former combatants peacefully re-integrate into society could help 
countries undergoing security sector reform avoid the outbreak of crime after periods of 
civil conflict.  
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